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Abstract 
 
The popularity of KiwiSaver, combined with a demographic shift to an ageing population, 
will make savings invested in KiwiSaver an important source of income in retirement.  To 
investigate the investment fund choices by KiwiSaver members a survey was circulated 
among 134 people; 87 KiwiSaver members, and 47 non-members.  Respondents answered 
questions on their investment behavior, knowledge, and risk attitudes towards investment in 
general, and KiwiSaver.  The results show investment in KiwiSaver tends to be conservative 
as a result of low levels of involvement, knowledge, and risk tolerance, and is more common 
among females.  Investment in riskier growth funds is mostly by younger people and those 
who are risk tolerant as measured by the KiwiSaver Risk Profile. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces the study of behavior and attitudes of members in the KiwiSaver 
scheme towards their investment funds.  A brief history of pension policy and retirement 
saving in New Zealand is given to place the introduction of the KiwiSaver scheme in 
context.  The design of the KiwiSaver Scheme is then summarised, with an emphasis on the 
enrolment, contribution, and investment choices that members of the scheme can make.  
Justification for studying KiwiSaver investment behavior is given by highlighting four 
issues; the changing demographics of the New Zealand population, the use of default rules 
in the KiwiSaver scheme, the conservatism of investor behavior, and the current state of 
academic psychological research into KiwiSaver.  An overview of the methods used is 
provided, followed by an outline of the rest of the thesis. 
 
Aim 
     This thesis is about the behavior and attitudes of members of the KiwiSaver Scheme.  
Specifically, the choices of investment fund that members of the KiwiSaver Scheme make 
are analysed.  The central focus of this thesis is exploring what factors can have an influence 
on this choice. 
  
Background to the KiwiSaver Scheme 
     Historically, New Zealand has a tradition of establishing generous government funded 
pension schemes, and low membership in work based privately managed pension schemes.  
This has contributed in many people relying on the benefits from the current government 
provided by the NZ Super Scheme as a main source of retirement income. 
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     In 1898 New Zealand become one of the first countries in the world, and the first in the 
British Empire, to establish a comprehensive public pension for any member of the 
population that reached retirement age, which at the time was 65 years of age (Ministry for 
Culture and Heritage, 2011).  Important features of this public pension scheme reappear 
frequently later in public pension policy in New Zealand.  These features included a pay-as-
you-go system where tax revenue from the working population was used to fund the pension 
scheme, and entitlement to receiving the pension was based on residential status (Preston, 
1997). 
     Forty years later the Social Security Act (1938) established a two tier pension system.  
The first tier consisted of a universal pension payable at age 65, and the second tier 
consisted of a means tested pension payable from age 60 (Preston, 1997).  The second tier 
was a response to the increasingly high proportion of manual workers in the workforce who 
were unable to continue working until 65 years of age, and often had limited financial means 
or savings (Preston, 1997).  The first tier universal pension remained free from income 
means testing. 
     There was a brief attempt to introduce a compulsory contributory superannuation scheme 
in 1975 by the Labour government.  This scheme did not last long, and the incoming 
National government replaced it in 1977 with the National Superannuation Scheme.  This 
scheme was universal, egalitarian, and accessible.  The new scheme paid a flat-rate taxable 
pension, independent from income testing and employment status, upon reaching the 
retirement age of 60, and only ten years of residency was required for full entitlement 
(Preston, 1997). 
     In 1996 the New Zealand public voted in a referendum on a Compulsory Retirement 
Superannuation Scheme (CRSS).  The CRSS was a defined benefit pension plan where 
individual saving accounts would be managed by competing private sector Superannuation 
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Savings Funds, from which a flat rate annuity would be provided (Preston, 1997).  Age-
related CRSS savings targets would be set with a capital top up from the government if these 
targets were not met (Preston, 1997).  While the CRSS still contained universal and 
egalitarian features, the main difference was a change to a save-as-you-go system where the 
working population would have to directly fund their own retirement income.  The 
referendum had a high voter turnout of 80.3%, and was comprehensively rejected with 
91.8% voting against the scheme (Preston, 1997).  
     In 2001 the New Zealand Superannuation Fund was created to ease the impact on the 
government’s finances which will become stretched over the next fifty years because of a 
shift to a higher proportion of elderly eligible for New Zealand Superannuation (McCulloch 
& Frances, 2001).  The New Zealand Superannuation Fund operates by investing 
contributions from the government to generate a profitable return.  This established an 
alternative source of funding for New Zealand Superannuation to minimise the future cost to 
taxpayers.  Without contributions from the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, the existing 
universal pension payments would increase from 4% to around 9% of GDP by 2050 
(McCulloch & Frances, 2001; Whitehead, 2006).  However, the investment returns from the 
Superannuation Fund may only be enough to cover the rising costs of financing 
superannuation, and not be able to reduce it (Whitehead, 2006).   
     A combination of factors has combined to cause a problem for New Zealand’s public 
pension system.  They include the expected demographic changes, where there will be a 
higher proportion of people over the age of 65, and a shrinking workforce able to support 
them.  Associated with this will be an ever increasing cost of New Zealand Superannuation 
to the taxpayer.  Additionally, the public had also now become so used to universal 
superannuation that it could be viewed as a financial birth right (Preston, 1997). 
4 
 
     A report by Inland Revenue showed that, prior to the introduction of KiwiSaver, the 
number of voluntary work-based superannuation schemes on offer had declined from 2,863 
in 1990 to 560 in 2007 (Inland Revenue, 2009).  Furthermore, although total membership in 
work-based superannuation schemes had increased to 735,952 in 1998, by 2007 that number 
had declined to 582,035 members.  In a speech on New Zealand’s saving performance, 
Whitehead (2007) argued that pro-saving action is desirable to increase the retirement 
savings of the New Zealand public, and does not necessarily have to be an expensive 
government intervention. 
 
[There is] evidence that well-designed intervention can be effective in raising saving 
without triggering too much additional government spending. This includes 
international evidence on compulsion and savings incentives. … [There is] also 
evidence on the power of default settings, in other words automatic enrolment. 
Participation in the American 401k programmes increased substantially when people 
had to opt out rather than opt in.  (Whitehead, 2007) 
 
     In 2006 the Labour government passed the KiwiSaver Act.  The stated purpose of this 
was to “encourage a savings habit and asset accumulation amongst individuals who may not 
be in a position to enjoy the standards of living in retirement similar to those in pre-
retirement” (KiwiSaver Act 2006).  Another reason for passing this legislation was to 
provide a new source of investment funds for the local capital markets (Inland Revenue, 
2011).  This has been welcomed by some members of the managed funds investment 
industry (Gaynor, 2012), but others warn of too much investment in the local economy 
(Carran, 2012). 
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     Despite historically being reliant on public pension schemes, the successful introduction, 
implementation, and uptake of KiwiSaver, contrasts with previous attempts to introduce 
nation-wide work-based superannuation funds.  There are two differences which have 
contributed to this success.  First, KiwiSaver is not compulsory, and remains a voluntary 
scheme.  Anyone who does not wish to be a member can choose to opt out.  Secondly, the 
design features, and financial benefits of KiwiSaver are more appealing.  For example, 
KiwiSaver is a defined contribution plan, and at age 65 all contributions made can be 
withdrawn instead of being issued a fixed annuity.  Additionally, the financial benefits of 
joining, including a $1,000 kickstart from the government, have been shown to be important 
elements of the KiwiSaver scheme for members (Matthews, 2011).  Many of these features 
were included in the design of the KiwiSaver scheme based on the research of other save-as-
you-go pension schemes overseas (Whitehead, 2007). 
     In summary, the history of New Zealand pension policy has tended to focus on a pay-as-
you-go system, with superannuation funded indirectly through taxation.  Previous attempts 
to establish nation-wide work based compulsory save-as-you-go superannuation schemes 
have often failed due to a variety of reasons.  However, the save-as-you-go KiwiSaver 
Superannuation Scheme differs in several important aspects.  Firstly, it is a voluntary 
scheme, and secondly, it is a defined contribution scheme allowing members to withdraw all 
their savings upon reaching retirement, instead of a fixed annuity.  Finally, previous research 
has shown that the financial benefits of joining are important elements of the scheme which 
can influence the decision to join KiwiSaver (Matthews, 2011). 
 
The KiwiSaver Superannuation Scheme 
     The following information about the design of the KiwiSaver scheme comes from the 
KiwiSaver website, http://www.kiwisaver.govt.nz/, where more detail about the scheme can 
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be found.  All statistics mentioned in this section have been retrieved from the Inland 
Revenue KiwiSaver Evaluation Annual Report for July 2011 to June 2012 (Inland Revenue, 
2012a) unless otherwise cited. 
The KiwiSaver Act (2006) 
     As previously stated, the purpose of the KiwiSaver Act (2006) is to “encourage a savings 
habit and asset accumulation amongst individuals who may not be in a position to enjoy the 
standards of living in retirement similar to those in pre-retirement.”  Another reason was to 
provide a new source of investment funds for the local capital markets (Inland Revenue, 
2011). 
     Enrolment in the KiwiSaver scheme became available to the public in July 2007.  
KiwiSaver is a direct contribution pension scheme with each member possessing their own 
account.  The basic premise of KiwiSaver is to automatically deduct a percentage of an 
employee’s gross salary, or wage, which is placed into a government approved investment 
fund.  Upon reaching the retirement age of 65, members can withdraw their contributions, 
plus or minus any investment returns made. 
Enrolment in the Scheme 
     Any New Zealand citizen, or permanent resident, under the age of 65 can join KiwiSaver.  
Any person not enrolled in KiwiSaver will be automatically enrolled upon beginning new 
employment, except for those who are under 18 years of age.  Existing employees can 
choose to voluntarily opt into KiwiSaver.  Individuals that are automatically enrolled can 
choose to opt out of the scheme up to eight weeks after being enrolled into the scheme.  
After that eight week period it is not possible to leave the KiwiSaver scheme.  Any 
individual who chooses to opt in cannot later change their mind and elect to opt out. 
     Total membership in the KiwiSaver scheme is just over 1.96 million people, an increase 
of 12% over the year to June 2012.  This represents an estimated 49% of the eligible 
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population enrolled in KiwiSaver.  These numbers are expected to grow as new employees 
entering the workforce are automatically enrolled, and existing employees continue to opt 
into the scheme.  Participation in KiwiSaver is not distributed evenly across age groups.  
Approximately 67% of eligible people aged between 18 and 24 are enrolled, reflecting the 
auto enrolment feature of KiwiSaver.  Approximately 62% of members have opted in, and 
38% have been automatically enrolled into the scheme.  Among the members that have been 
automatically enrolled, about 8% chose their own scheme, and the remaining 92% were 
enrolled in a default scheme by their employer or Inland Revenue. 
Contributions 
     Currently, contribution rates to KiwiSaver can be 2%, 4%, or 8% of an employee’s gross 
salary or wage.  If a contribution rate is not specified by a member, then the default rate of 
2% applies.  The majority of members (59%) are contributing the minimum rate of 2%, 
while 36% are contributing 4%, and only 4% of members are contributing 8%, the highest 
rate possible.  Employers are required to make matching contributions which are equivalent 
to at least 2% of the employee’s gross salary or wage.  The vast majority of employers 
(89%) only match contributions up to the legal minimum of two percent.  Additional 
voluntary contributions from the employee into their KiwiSaver account can be made on top 
of this automatic pay deduction, but do not receive a matching contribution from their 
employer.  The government also provides an annual Member Tax Credit of 50 cents for each 
dollar contributed, excluding employer contributions, up to a maximum of $521.43.  
Another government provided benefit is the $1,000 kick start paid into new KiwiSaver 
accounts. 
     After becoming a KiwiSaver member and making contributions for at least 12 months, 
members can apply for a contributions holiday where they can stop contributing to their 
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KiwiSaver account for a period of time.  The contributions holiday can last from three 
months to five years. 
Investment of Funds 
     KiwiSaver Scheme providers are private sector organisations, notably banks, insurers and 
financial asset managers, which offer a KiwiSaver scheme where KiwiSaver contributions 
are invested and managed.  Members can only be enrolled in one scheme at a time, but are 
free to change schemes at any time they choose.  If members do not choose a scheme when 
they are enrolled they will be placed by default into their employer’s nominated scheme, or 
if the employer has not nominated a preferred scheme, Inland Revenue chooses on their 
behalf a scheme from one of six government appointed default providers.  Employee 
contributions deducted at the default rate of 2% would then be invested in the most 
conservative investment fund offered by the provider. 
     By December 2012 an estimated $13.6 billion was invested across various KiwiSaver 
schemes (Morningstar, 2012).  This represents an estimated 17% of the managed funds 
market.  This proportion is expected to increase as membership and KiwiSaver account 
balances grow.  However, the distribution of assets amongst schemes is heavily weighted 
towards the larger schemes.  For example, three schemes have over $1 billion of assets 
under management, and this represents 38% of all KiwiSaver assets.  These schemes also 
happen to be offered by three of the default providers, OnePath, AMP, and ASB, which 
automatically get a share of members that do not make a choice of provider after being 
automatically enrolled. 
     Many schemes offered by providers give members the option of investing their savings in 
a variety of funds that vary in their level of investment risk.  Table 1.1 describes the most 
common types of investment fund offered.  The main asset classes that KiwiSaver schemes 
invest in are cash, fixed interest, property, and shares.  An estimated $5.1 billion is invested 
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in conservative funds, which includes $4.3 billion invested among the default funds.  In 
comparison, only $900 million is invested in aggressive type funds and $2.2 billion in 
growth type funds (Morningstar, 2012).  That leaves approximately $4.2 billion invested in 
balanced type funds, which split the investment of assets evenly among growth and income 
assets.  There is no calculation of the amount invested in the lifetime’s option because it is 
an umbrella term that covers assets under management invested among the other fund types 
depending on the investor’s age. 
Table 1.1 
Common Categories of Investment Funds Offered 
Fund Type Allocation of Assets 
Cash (low risk) Bank deposits and other fixed interest investments 
Conservative (low to 
     medium risk) 
A high proportion in bank deposits and fixed interest investments, 
and a lower proportion in growth assets such as shares and property 
Balanced (medium 
     risk) 
A more equal split between higher risk growth assets such as shares 
and property, and more stable investments including fixed interest 
and bank deposits 
Growth (medium to 
     high risk) 
A high proportion of shares and property with a lower level of bank 
deposits and fixed interest 
Aggressive (high risk) Mainly shares  
Lifetimes option Adjusts an investor's allocations to the five main types of investment 
funds based on his or her specific length of time to the standard New 
Zealand Superannuation qualification age (currently 65)  
Note. Adapted from http://www.kiwisaver.govt.nz/providers/about/funds/ 
Withdrawals 
     Withdrawals from KiwiSaver funds can be made when members become eligible for 
New Zealand Superannuation, currently set at 65 years of age, and contributions have been 
made for five years.  Withdrawals can be made in a lump sum payment.  By July 2012 the 
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KiwiSaver scheme will have been running for five years.  It is estimated that approximately 
25,000 members
1
 will be able to make withdrawals in July and August 2012, with over 75% 
of these members able to withdraw savings of between $5,000 and $20,000, excluding 
investment returns.  An early withdrawal can also be made by first home buyers to purchase 
a house.  This withdrawal can be made after making contributions for at least three years, 
and only member and employer contributions can be withdrawn.  The estimated mean 
average first home withdrawal is $9,640 per member (Inland Revenue, 2011). 
Changes to the KiwiSaver Scheme 
     Changes to KiwiSaver have been made twice in 2009 and 2011, with further changes 
scheduled for 2013.  In April 2009 changes to the contribution rates were made.  Previously 
there were two rates of 4% and 8%, with 4% being the default rate.  The new minimum 
contribution rate of 2% was established for both employees and employers.  The default rate 
also dropped from 4 percent to 2 percent.  Changes made in 2011 included halving the 
annual member tax credit from a previous rate of $1 for every $1 contributed up to a 
maximum of $1042.86 to the current 50c for every dollar up to a maximum of $521.43. 
     Future changes to KiwiSaver in 2013 include raising the minimum contribution rate to 
3%, scheduled to take effect from 1 April 2013.  Compulsory matching employer 
contributions will also rise to 3% (Inland Revenue, 2012b).  A proposed change was to 
automatically enrol all eligible workers not currently enrolled in KiwiSaver, while leaving 
them the choice to opt out.  This method of soft compulsion has been delayed due to the 
financial cost to the government, but may be considered again later once the government 
returns the fiscal budget to surplus (Good Returns, 2011). 
 
 
                                                 
1To be eligible these members must have been aged over 60  when they enrolled in July or August 2007. 
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Importance of Analysing KiwiSaver Investment Fund Choice 
     The rapid uptake in enrolments means that KiwiSaver is likely to become a major source 
of saving for retirement.  Standard of living in retirement may therefore become heavily 
influenced by the saving behavior and investment choices of KiwiSaver members.  There are 
four important issues that need to be addressed surrounding investment fund choice by 
members in KiwiSaver.  They are the changing demographics of the New Zealand 
population, the use of default rules in KiwiSaver, the conservatism of investor behavior, and 
the state of academic psychological research of KiwiSaver. 
Changing Demographics 
     Over the next 50 years the proportion of the population over the age of 65 is projected to 
increase from 12% to 27% and the working age population will fall from 65% to 59% 
(McCulloch & Frances, 2001).  Furthermore, the effects of increased life-expectancy, and 
falling fertility rates in the western world will combine to make this a more permanent 
demographic shift.  While there are currently approximately five workers per retiree, by 
2050 that is projected to become approximately two workers per retiree, and is expected to 
remain at that ratio even after the baby boomer blip has passed (McCulloch & Frances, 
2001; Whitehead, 2006). 
     This will put considerable financial strain on the affordability of the current universal 
New Zealand Superannuation Scheme.  In addition, the investment of the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund is expected to barely cover the rising costs associated with this 
demographic change (Whitehead, 2006).  The success of the KiwiSaver Scheme may be 
essential to easing the financial pressures of providing income for the retired population. 
     Adequacy of income in retirement may also be affected by the increase in life expectancy 
seen in New Zealand, and in other developed countries.  This naturally increases the length 
of retirement, both in absolute terms, and in relative terms in comparison to a person’s 
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working life during which they can save for their retirement.  Increased longevity may also 
lead to increased health costs for retirees as age related illnesses become more common in 
an ageing population.  Additionally, advances made in preventative medical health care and 
improved living standards may lead to an increase in retirees becoming more active than 
before, resulting in higher standard of living costs.  This could place added financial strain 
on the fixed income nature of retirement savings. 
     With over half of the New Zealand population projected to be enrolled in KiwiSaver and 
the ever increasing sums of money being invested, it is becoming increasingly important to 
understand the choices people make with their retirement savings.  The choice between 
investment funds offered by scheme providers can affect a person’s standard of living in 
retirement because of the differences in exposure to investment risk and expected returns. 
Prevalence of Investment in Default Funds 
     Using the effect of automatic enrolment, instead of only offering financial incentives, 
was relied on to increase participation rates in the KiwiSaver scheme (Toder & Khitatrakun, 
2006).  As a result defaults had to be arranged for members that did not choose their scheme 
provider, investment fund, or contribution rate.  New employees enrolled in KiwiSaver who 
do not choose a KiwiSaver scheme are automatically placed into a default fund.  This could 
be with a preferred scheme provider nominated by the employer.  If there is no employer 
nominated default scheme then the Inland Revenue will place the new member into the most 
conservative fund option of one of six government nominated default scheme providers.  
The default providers are AMP, ASB, AXA
2
, OnePath, Mercer, and Tower.  As Toder and 
Khitatrakun (2006) note, it was expected that many members would end up enrolled in the 
default fund and would not leave it. 
                                                 
2 Since completing this study KiwiSaver Scheme provider AXA has merged with AMP under the AMP brand. 
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     One-third of members have not made an active choice of fund to invest in and remain in 
the conservative default fund assigned (Inland Revenue, 2012a).  Why this occurs has not 
yet been determined.  One possibility is that investment in the conservative funds has 
recently been yielding larger returns during the recent economic recession and slow recovery 
(Morningstar, 2012).  Other possibilities include apathy of members to make an active 
choice of investment fund, or members are more risk averse to investing in the equity-heavy 
growth funds.  Another possible reason is that the choice of fund is less important than 
joining to take advantage of the contribution matching features of the scheme from 
employers and the government (Matthews, 2011). 
     There is evidence that there have been few transfers made by members out of their 
provided default scheme.  In 2010 it was reported that less than one fifth of automatic 
enrolees appeared to make an active choice of scheme provider (Inland Revenue, 2010a).  
Subsequent annual reports from Inland Revenue have not provided any more information on 
the number of automatic enrolees who decided to actively choose which scheme to belong 
to.  However, it is likely that the number of automatically enrolled members changing 
schemes will continue to remain very low. 
     There is also evidence that there have been few people changing their default 
contribution rate.  A default contribution rate of 2% currently applies when a new employee 
is placed into a default scheme, and is scheduled to rise to 3% in April 2013.   Before April 
2009 the default rate was 4 percent.  For members enrolled before April 2009, 67% are 
contributing at 4%, and for members enrolled after April 2009, 80% are contributing at 2% 
(Inland Revenue, 2011).  The minimum default rate at the time of enrolment is clearly a 
contributing factor in determining the current contribution rate.  
     A Ministry of Economic Development report in 2008 identified a number of factors that 
could be influencing many members to remain in their appointed default scheme.  One 
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possible factor is that membership of conservative default funds could be seen in the 
economic context when KiwiSaver was introduced.  Low returns on investment in the share 
market over the last five years to 2012 have seen many conservative funds match, or even 
better, the returns of growth type funds.  Another possible factor is that, for many KiwiSaver 
members, this will be the first time they are entering the investment market, and they lack 
the necessary financial literacy to make an informed choice of investment.  There may be a 
preference to avoid the risk of growth funds, due to a lack of knowledge about long term 
investing.  By comparison, conservative funds and their fixed income nature may be 
preferred due to their bank account style risk profile.  Another factor influencing default 
scheme membership could be the government endorsement that goes with being nominated 
as a default provider.  Membership with a default provider could be viewed as beneficial, 
because they have been recognised as successful and trustworthy fund managers by the 
government. 
     In summary, there are many possible reasons why there is a relatively high prevalence of 
investment in default funds.  The long term investment in these funds may not result in the 
higher level of returns possible by investment in the riskier growth type funds.  However, 
the reasons for choosing to remain in a default fund are not necessarily irrational.  Lack of 
investment knowledge or being highly risk averse are reasonable explanations for remaining 
invested in a conservative default fund. 
Conservative Investment Trend 
     As previously mentioned, over a long investment time horizon the low risk conservative 
type funds are expected to provide a lower return than riskier growth type funds.  An upside 
to this is that conservative type funds provide a lower probability of negative returns.  Low 
risk conservative type funds may be the best option for someone who is near retirement to 
protect their investment from losing value.  However, for a young person with a longer 
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investment time horizon it may be more beneficial to invest in higher return growth type 
funds because their long time horizon enables the chance to recover from any investment 
losses made.  However, this depends on the returns from human capital of the investor, the 
present value of future labour earnings, being more positively correlated with ‘bond’ returns 
than stock returns (Boyle & Guthrie, 2005; Jagannathan & Kocherlakota, 1996).  As age 
increases, the present value of human capital falls.  Optimal reallocation to ‘bonds’ are then 
made to retain the same level of investment risk in the portfolio. 
     The Morningstar KiwiSaver Performance Survey for the 2012 December quarter assesses 
the performance of 16 KiwiSaver providers and reported $13.65 billion of assets under 
management held between these providers (Morningstar, 2012).  This represents a 
significant amount of the total amount invested in the whole KiwiSaver scheme and is partly 
due to the inclusion of all six default providers and the large amount of assets managed in 
their default schemes.  The survey shows that $5,142.3 million, about 38%, is invested in 
conservative funds, of which $4,347.2 million is invested in the six default funds 
collectively.  Unfortunately, there is no breakdown of age among those invested in the 
default funds.  Therefore, it is not possible to determine what proportion of them could 
benefit from investment in a growth type fund. 
Previous Research about KiwiSaver 
     Studying the investment fund choice of KiwiSaver members is important, because 
previous studies and surveys have typically focussed on reasons for joining the KiwiSaver 
Scheme, or choice of provider, but not on choice of investment fund (Inland Revenue, 
2012a; Matthews, 2011; Thomas & Matthews, 2012).  Additionally, data on the behavior of 
KiwiSaver members tends to focus on the segmentation of the population based on 
demographic characteristics, specifically age and income (Inland Revenue, 2012a).  
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Therefore, there has been little research behind the psychology of investment behavior and 
attitudes of KiwiSaver members. 
     Because KiwiSaver is a relatively new scheme, operating since July 2007, there has been 
limited time for conducting academic research.  In a study on the flow of funds between 
providers, Thomas and Matthews (2012) report KiwiSaver members chase the good 
performance of scheme providers.  While the focus was on provider membership, it was 
recognised that introducing more variables and taking a fund by fund approach could yield 
greater insight into KiwiSaver investor behavior. 
     The majority of research conducted has come from stakeholders in KiwiSaver, the 
government and the private sector, with the results often published in the news media.  The 
Inland Revenue Department, which manages the KiwiSaver scheme, does publish statistical 
data, although it takes a financial perspective when focusing on membership trends and 
contribution levels.  It does not focus on the causes of the trends, and has relatively little 
information on demographic trends. 
     In its KiwiSaver Joint Evaluation Strategy document the IRD states that one of its 
objectives is to “assess the response to KiwiSaver in order to understand the scale and 
pattern of the take-up” (Inland Revenue, 2006).  A 2010 Inland Revenue report summarises 
the results from a survey that was designed to assess the impact of KiwiSaver on individuals 
during its first three years.  In addition to analysing the demographic patterns of KiwiSaver 
members, three derived variables of risk attitude, knowledge of KiwiSaver, and engagement 
in KiwiSaver, were analysed (Inland Revenue, 2010b).  Risk attitude was assessed by asking 
two questions about risk attitudes in general, and willingness to accept more risk to achieve 
higher returns.  A total of 78 percent surveyed answered that they were average or low risk 
takers.  This could explain the high proportion of KiwiSaver members who are invested in 
conservative funds.  While the IRD survey analysed risk attitude in relation to various 
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demographic variables it failed to analyse it in relation to the type of fund held.  Knowledge 
of the KiwiSaver scheme was assessed by asking about awareness of the schemes features.  
From the sixteen features of the scheme shown, 85% of members were aware of at least nine 
of them, compared with 64% of non-members.  Engagement with the KiwiSaver scheme 
was assessed by asking questions about how often members made an active decision about 
their account, or considered making a decision.  A total of 57% showed moderate or little 
engagement, and 15% showed no engagement at all.  While 23% considered more than one 
type of investment fund, only 5% actually indicated that they switched their savings from 
one fund into another. 
     While the Inland Revenue survey assessed extensively the reasons why some people join 
KiwiSaver, it does not go on to ask which type of fund they are in.  The tendancy of low risk 
tolerance, high recognition of various features, and moderate to low engagement with 
KiwiSaver, can be particularly informative of fund choice.  In particular, the low 
engagement and risk attitude scores indicate a possible reason why members remain in 
conservative default funds, but it is not possible to make this association with this survey 
data. 
     Research in the public sector also tends to focus on more concrete variables, such as 
membership enrolment trends and demographic factors.  There is also a greater focus on 
quantifying provider membership, rather than fund type membership.  For example, 
Matthews (2011) report most KiwiSaver members either, have their default provider 
allocated for them by the IRD, or choose their main bank as their provider.  This has resulted 
in the default providers and the main banks possessing the largest market share of members 
and funds under management. 
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Approaches to the study of saving behavior 
     The study of KiwiSaver investor behavior can be approached in two ways.  Both research 
fields of economics and psychology can be used to assess the financial behavior of 
KiwiSaver members.  However, both fields of study approach behavior in different ways.  
Warneryd (1999) argues that an economic approach will tend to focus on predicting the 
behavior of KiwiSaver members, while a psychological approach will tend to focus on 
describing and explaining the same behavior.  However, there is an increasing trend for 
psychologists to study decision making in an economic context, and economists are starting 
to use psychological ideas, concepts, and methods, like laboratory experiments (Warneryd, 
1999).  This new interdisciplinary approach is reflected in the use of the terms ‘behavioral 
economics’ and ‘economic psychology’ respectively. 
     Psychological research can be defined as establishing behavioral laws, and focusing on 
individual differences and the contingencies that cause them.  In the context of economic 
psychology, this translates to finding intervening variables between economic stimuli and 
consumer reactions (Warneryd, 1999).  Intervening variables can be psychological variables, 
like risk tolerance, which can be used to characterise segments of the population. 
     Because KiwiSaver is a retirement savings scheme, the purpose of using an economic 
psychology approach will be to identify different segments of the population, and find the 
variables that characterise the differences between them.  These variables can be 
psychological in nature, such as risk attitudes.  They can also be external economic 
variables, like how much will be needed to save for retirement.  Finally, there could also be 
demographic variables, where different age groups could have different saving rates or 
habits.  These variables may not necessarily be mutually exclusive from each other.  For 
example, the demographic variable of age could be related to the psychological variable of 
risk tolerance. 
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Survey Methods 
     Studies that examine saving schemes can draw data either from surveys of individuals 
enrolled in a savings scheme or from plan data about the scheme itself.  Both types of 
studies have different strengths and weaknesses with respect to the different variables 
measured and analysed. 
     Plan specific data typically comes from companies that implement retirement savings 
programs, and examine how specific details of a retirement plan can directly affect 
observable outcomes.  For example, differences in contribution levels, asset allocation, and 
participation rates, can be studied between plans that may differ on the default rules or the 
size and scope of the incentives provided of the respective schemes.  While plan specific 
data can produce information on aggregate demographic patterns, they do not take into 
account many variables that differ between individuals that can affect behavior in a 
retirement plan.  In every population there will be some people who save, and others who do 
not save.  Therefore, aggregate data can conceal important differences between different 
segments of savers in the population (Warneryd, 1999). 
     Survey data often contains substantial information about an individual, including other 
sources of income, and scales can be used to measure various psychological characteristics.  
Survey data can also be collected from individuals who are not members of a retirement 
plan, allowing an analysis of the differences that may exist between members and non-
members.  This makes surveys a valuable way to collect data on psychological variables that 
could affect investment behavior in a retirement plan.  For example, the level of risk an 
individual is willing to tolerate could be a significant factor in choosing where their savings 
are invested. 
     Because this thesis is primarily concerned with how individual psychological differences 
affect their choices of KiwiSaver funds invested in, a survey was deemed to be the best 
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approach to assess these variables.  It allows the measurement of psychological variables, 
like risk attitudes, and demographic information.  An additional benefit of survey methods is 
that questions can be asked about information commonly analysed in plan specific data, like 
contribution rates.  This can allow an analysis of individual KiwiSaver information and 
psychological variables, without letting the aggregate data mask differences that can define 
different population segments. 
 
Thesis Outline 
     This thesis compromises a total of seven chapters.  Chapter one has summarised the aim 
and scope of this study.  It has also introduced the KiwiSaver Superannuation Scheme and 
highlighted issues that are important to address and was followed by a review of the 
appropriate methods to be used. 
     Chapter 2 reviews the literature on economic and psychological models of saving for 
retirement, and assesses their applicability towards the study of KiwiSaver.  This is followed 
by a review of a selection of studies, both psychological and economic, which can affect 
choices made by individuals with respect to their behavior and attitudes towards saving for 
retirement.  The potential applicability and influence of variables may have when studying 
KiwiSaver are summarised, with hypotheses derived from this analysis. 
     Chapter 3 provides the methods used, and details the design and implementation of the 
survey used in the study.  The results from the study are then reported in Chapter 4. 
     A discussion of the findings is presented in Chapter 5.  Implications for the future 
direction of the KiwiSaver scheme and limitations of the study are considered.  A conclusion 
briefly summarising this study and the main findings reached is given in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
     The literature review begins by briefly defining what is considered saving and the various 
motives behind saving.  The recurrence of the life cycle motive, which encompasses saving 
for retirement, is highlighted illustrating the tendency to view planning for retirement as 
saving and not investing.  This is followed by a review of various models on saving for 
retirement and their relation to what they could contribute in studying the KiwiSaver 
scheme.  The next section reviews variables that could influence KiwiSaver investment fund 
choice.  The final section proposes various hypotheses about investment fund choice to be 
tested in an exploratory survey study. 
 
Saving for Retirement 
Saving Acts and Motives 
     What is saving can be difficult to define.  For example, saving could refer to a child 
saving their pocket money over four weeks and then spending it on buying a toy.  On a 
weekly basis, the child may be considered to save.  However, on a monthly basis no money 
has been saved because it has been spent.  This conceptual issue arises when saving is 
defined as spending income at a later time, but the time horizon is ill defined.  Therefore, it 
is important to consider the time-horizon, or accounting period, when analysing studies of 
saving because it will affect the definitions of who saves and how much has been saved 
(Webley & Nyhus, 2008). 
     In Warneryd’s psychology of saving there are two important factors to consider, the 
perception of future needs, and the provision of future needs (Warneryd, 1999).  The study 
of these perceptions, actions and the links between them are the domain of the psychology of 
saving.  The prominent question is, why do some people save and others do not.  Warneryd 
(1999) argues that how this question is answered will depend on the definition of saving.  If 
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saving is defined as the excess of income over consumption, then economic variables such 
as financial conditions and socioeconomic factors would provide more adequate answers, 
although this would not preclude psychological variables from the analysis.  If, saving is 
defined as refraining from consumption now, then the question to be asked is why 
consumption is refrained from in the present in favour of future consumption.  Warneryd 
(1999) argues that a psychology of saving should focus on the process of why money is 
saved in the present to consume in the future.  The how and the why of this process should 
be more important than the outcome.  In the context of studying KiwiSaver, the focus would 
then be on why people join the scheme and how they save once they are enrolled. 
     Warneryd (1999) asked respondents to what extent they consider the following acts to be 
saving.  Table 2.1 shows the list of responses in descending order of the typicality of the act 
of saving. Contributing to a pension scheme was not included in this list, however previous 
research has shown it to be a highly typical form of saving (Groenland, Bloem, & Kuylen, 
1996). 
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Table 2.1 
Acts Considered to be Examples of Saving 
Savings Act 
Put money in saving account 
Open term deposit 
Put money in savings box 
Buy bonds 
Consume less than income 
Participate in mutual funds 
Pay off mortgage 
Buy securities 
Buy shares 
Put money in check account 
Speculate with money 
Note. Adapted from The Psychology of Saving (p. 67), by Warneryd, 1999, Cheltenham: 
Elgar. 
     The motives for saving are varied yet there is a consensus in the literature about what 
they are.  Keynes (1936, in Webley & Nyhus, 2008) identified eight motives for saving 
shown in Table 2.2.  Webley and Nyhus (2008) state that most economic theories of saving 
focus on the second motive, the life-cycle motive because it embodies an obvious reason for 
saving money, which is to spend it later.  The time horizon for the life cycle motive depends 
when financial need begins to exceed income.  This can be when a person retires from the 
workforce resulting in the need to spend their savings as they can no longer depend on a 
regular income from employment. 
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Table 2.2 
Motives for Saving 
To build up a reserve against unforeseen contingencies (the precautionary motive) 
To provide for the anticipated future relationship between income and needs (the life cycle 
     motive) 
To enjoy interest (the inter-temporal substitution motive) 
To enjoy a gradually improving expenditure (the improvement motive) 
To enjoy a sense of independence and power to do things (the independence motive) 
To secure a masse de manoeuvre to carry out speculative or business projects (the enterprise 
     motive) 
To bequeath a fortune (the bequest motive) 
To satisfy pure miserliness (the avarice motive) 
Note. Adapted from Inter-temporal choice and self-control: Saving and borrowing. In A. 
Lewis (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Psychology and Economic Behavior, (p. 119), by 
Webley and Nyhus, 2008, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
     Katona (1975) is often regarded as one of the first researchers to have empirically 
investigated the psychology of saving.  Katona (1975) argued that there are four motives to 
save which are emergencies, retirement, the needs of children and family, and to buy 
expensive purchases like houses, businesses, durables, and vacations.  These motives are 
similar to Keynes’ (1936) list and are roughly equivalent to the precautionary, life-cycle, and 
the enterprise motives. 
     Katona’s theory of saving was based on two factors, ability to save and willingness to 
save.  Ability to save was assessed objectively through aggregate data on total household 
disposable income.  Willingness to save was measured through subjective data on 
psychological variables collected from households.  The combination of ability and 
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willingness combines economic and psychological variables into an economic psychology 
theory of saving, especially when ability and willingness are interpreted in a broad sense and 
modern cognitive and social psychology are exploited (Warneryd, 1999). 
     Katona distinguished three types of saving based on his reasons and motives for saving 
which are contractual saving, discretionary saving, and residual saving.  Contractual saving 
is similar to pre-commitment and often requires a voluntary decision to start saving, with 
subsequent saving enforced.  For example, entering a retirement savings plan like KiwiSaver 
would be a voluntary decision and an automatic deduction from an employee’s pay would be 
the enforcement of this saving decision.  Discretionary saving relates to the room for 
genuine decisions that many people have in affluent societies where money is left over after 
satisfying basic needs.  People may decide to save for many different reasons and 
understanding the decision process would be important.  Residual saving refers to money 
that has not been spent and is saved by default.  This has often been the classical view of 
saving where consumption has been assumed to be the priority.  However, residual saving 
could also be a result of active strict control of expenditure (Warneryd, 1999). 
     In another review of saving motives Warneryd (1999) listed six reasons shown in Table 
2.3.  The first reason is not technically a reason because there is no intention or motive to 
save.  The second reason equates to Keynes’ (1936) avarice motive, and the third reason is 
roughly equivalent to the improvement motive. The fourth and sixth reasons are nearly a 
straight copy from Keynes’ (1936) list.  Finally, the fifth reason combines the concept of 
Katona’s (1975) contractual type of saving and the lifecycle motive from Keynes (1936). 
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Table 2.3 
Reasons for Saving 
Remainder or surplus arises without explicit intention to save (by default; abundance) 
Hoarding for recurrent needs or greater needs in the future (e.g. hoarding by squirrels) 
The growth of assets is expected to give increased possibility of need satisfaction in the 
     future (saving seeds or lending against interest) 
Reserve for uncertainty and risk (precautionary motive) 
Voluntary contractual commitment (e.g. paying into pension schemes or self-imposed forced 
     saving) 
Widened time horizon (thinking of future generations; bequest motive) 
Note. Adapted from The Psychology of Saving (p. 57), by Warneryd, 1999, Cheltenham: 
Elgar. 
     In a study assessing saving motives Canova, Rattazzi, and Webley (2005) sent out a mail 
questionnaire asking if respondents were going to save over the next twelve months and to 
provide four reasons to explain why they were saving, and the importance of those reasons.  
Three trends emerged from the analysis.  First, there was an avoidance of debt and financial 
security, which could be interpreted as the precautionary motive, or the independence 
motive.  Second, there was a desire to save for self-gratification, for example, going on a 
holiday.  Third, there was a focus on old age and retirement which is clearly related to both 
the precautionary and life-cycle motives. 
     The review of the literature on saving motives shows that Keynes’ (1936) list of saving 
motives has reliably stood the test of time.  Other lists of saving motives can easily be 
related back to Keynes’ original list.  Although there is some variation in saving motives, a 
common reason given in every list is the life-cycle motive which is the motive behind saving 
for retirement.  In his ‘psychology of saving’, Warneryd (1999) argues that a focus on 
27 
 
psychological variables is necessary to understand why people save according to the life 
cycle motive.  
Modern Portfolio Theory 
     An important part of the life cycle hypothesis is that the middle aged should save for 
retirement.  However, it does not recommend a best way to save for retirement.  Today, 
saving from income alone is not sufficient enough to provide for the increasingly lengthier 
periods of retirement (Warneryd, 1999).  To be financially secure in retirement it is 
beneficial to invest any savings made to generate a profitable return. 
     The concept of modern portfolio theory, first described by Markowitz (1952), states that 
financial investments should be diversified to limit risk which is measured by the variance 
of returns.  However, the trade-off between risk and return can differ depending on the 
investment goals of the portfolio.  For example, a young person saving for retirement could 
invest in a risky portfolio of shares with high expected returns.  The long investment horizon 
means that there is time to recover from any short term drop in value of the portfolio and it 
is still expected to grow over the long term (Malliaris & Malliaris, 2008).  However, for 
someone nearing retirement the shorter investment time horizon means that less risk is 
desirable.  Therefore, the investment portfolio should invest in assets with less variability in 
returns, but this reduced risk is associated with lower expected returns. 
     Canner, Mankiw, and Weil (1997) have shown that common investment advice is to 
invest a greater ratio of bonds to equities, not as time horizon decreases, but as risk tolerance 
decreases.  Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) argue that, although stocks are more likely 
to outperform bonds over long time horizons, the rebalancing of portfolios makes this 
irrelevant.  The rebalancing of a portfolio changes the investment horizon from one period 
with a long horizon to several periods with shorter horizons.  With shorter time horizons for 
stocks, their risk of investment increases. 
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     The common advice to shift an asset allocation away from stocks as someone ages does 
make economic sense when the value of human capital is considered (Boyle & Guthrie, 
2005; Jagannathan & Kocherlakota, 1996).  As age increases, human capital, which is the 
present value of future labour earnings, decreases.  The optimal way to respond to the 
decrease in the value of human capital is to rebalance the portfolio towards ‘bonds’, 
provided human capital returns are more positively correlated with ‘bond’ returns than with 
stock returns.  This echoes the common financial advice given by KiwiSaver providers that 
members should shift their investments as they age from equity heavy growth type funds 
towards more conservative funds invested in bonds and term deposits. 
Theory of Planned Behavior 
     The theory of planned behavior, shown in Figure 2.1, is a model that factors in the 
predictive value of attitudes norms, perceived behavioral control and intentions to predict 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991).  According to this theory, attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioural control affect behavioural intentions.  Intentions, in turn, influence the 
occurrence of the behavior.  Attitudes refer to evaluations, appraisals and feelings, social 
norms are the perceived perceptions from peer groups, and perceived behavioural control is 
the assessment of ability to perform the behavior which can reflect past experiences of 
performing the behavior.  Together, these factors indicate an intention to perform the 
behavior.  Intention to perform the behavior does not necessarily mean the behavior will be 
performed.  However, as a general rule, the stronger the intention, the greater the likelihood 
the behavior will be performed. 
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Figure 2.1. Theory of Planned Behavior 
Note. From “Theory of Planned Behavior” by Ajzen, 1991, Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 50(2), p.182 
     A meta-analysis of 185 empirical tests of the theory of planned behavior reported in 161 
journal articles was conducted by Armitage and Conner (2001).  The theory was reported to 
be a valid predictor of behavior and intentions.  In the meta-analysis the theory accounted 
for 27% of the variation in behavior and 39% of the variation in intentions. 
     In a specific application of the theory of planned behavior, East (1993) examined the 
application for shares in privatised British industries.  East (1993) reported that application 
for shares could be predicted from measured intention which in turn could be predicted from 
measures of attitudes, social norms, perceived control, and past behavior.  Additionally there 
was a strong influence of friends and relatives on these factors. 
     According to this model, KiwiSaver investor behavior could be predicted primarily by 
personal and interpersonal variables.  For example, a positive attitude and a behavioral 
history of saving or planning for the future, combined with the social norm of other friends 
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and family members joining KiwiSaver, could influence participation in the scheme.  
Furthermore, this model could be applied to the choice of investment fund made.  While it 
may be perceived to be a social norm to participate in KiwiSaver, a lack of discussion about 
investment funds could result in inertia upon joining.  This would influence the decision, or 
lack thereof, to remain invested in the provided default fund.  Alternatively, attitudes 
towards investment risk could influence the choice between conservative and growth funds. 
Purchase of retirement plan decision-making models 
     Rickwood and White (2009) proposed a model that looked at the pre-purchase stage of 
decision making within the context of buying financial services.  The model was a result of 
exploratory research using focus groups to determine the important factors behind decisions 
to save for retirement.  Rickwood and White (2009) recognised that many elements of pre-
purchase decision making had been studied, but this was the first time they had all been 
analysed in a single study in the area of financial services.  The purpose of the study was to 
establish which variables, or set of variables, would have the most influence on decisions to 
save for retirement.  Their proposed model is shown in Figure 2.2.  The proposed model 
consists of three categories of internal, external, and risk factors that can affect the 
likelihood of saving for retirement.  The most important factors are in the shaded boxes 
while other significant but less important factors are in the clear boxes. 
     Major internal factors are the person’s involvement level, motivation, and needs and 
wants.  Involvement level was particularly low.  Retirement was not a common discussion 
topic among friends, and little information was actively sought.  The exception was for 
married men between the 40 and 55 years of age.  When it came to motivation, increased 
age emerged as the strongest influence to save for retirement.  The factor of needs and wants 
refers to the identification of education and easily readable information as important to 
saving for retirement. 
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Figure 2.2. Proposed Decision Making Model for Saving for Retirement 
Note. From “Pre-purchase decision-making for a complex service: Retirement planning,” by  
Rickwood and White, 2009, Journal of Services Marketing, 23(3), p. 147 
     Major external factors are influence from family and marketers, and also competitive 
options.  The biggest external factor to save for retirement was familial influence, 
particularly becoming married and having children.  Marketer influence also had a 
significant impact with the media identified as a way of either, gathering information, or 
triggering thoughts about beginning to save. 
     Financial, functional, and psychological risk are also major influences.  These had a 
negative impact with participants identifying changes in rules and regulations and lack of 
unbiased professional advice as major concerns.  This made participants cautious about 
investing in saving schemes.  The authors concluded that, the concerns about the difficulty 
of financial preparation for retirement, combined with the perceived high level of risk and 
complex information, could hinder desire to save for retirement. 
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     While Rickwood and White (2009) highlight many factors that have a positive or 
negative influence on decisions to save for retirement , they single out age, specifically 
turning 40, and marriage as significant turning points in a person’s life that lead them to 
consider saving for retirement. 
     Harrison, Waite, and White (2006) used qualitative data from focus groups to derive a 
model of consumer decision making process in the purchase of pensions shown in Figure 
2.3.  Their analysis focused on the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors of individuals during 
the pre-purchase, purchase and post-purchase stages of the decision making process. 
 
Figure 2.3 Three-Stage Financial Services Decision-Making Framework 
Note. From “Analysis by paralysis: The pension purchase decision process,” by Harrison et 
al., 2006, International Journal of Bank Marketing, 24(1), p. 11 
     Their analysis found saving for retirement tended to be affected mostly by attitudes to 
retirement with saving often triggered by negative motives about not saving.  Choosing to 
buy into a pension plan was characterised by limited search behavior, preference of personal 
sources, reluctance to seek professional help, confusion, and lack of awareness of options.  
Even after purchasing a pension, difficulties were cited in evaluating the quality and extent 
of the pension plan meeting retirement needs. 
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     One of the most important factors in the decision process highlighted by Harrison et al. 
(2006) was a perceived lack of accessible and reliable information and a reluctance to use 
advice from professional experts.  Rickwood and White (2009) also reported concerns about 
professional advice hindered the likelihood of saving for retirement.  This concern and 
reluctance to seek professional advice illustrates how decisions on retirement savings may 
not be completely informed. 
     The implications are that planning and saving for retirement can be triggered by 
significant changes in a person’s life (Rickwood & White, 2009), and the awareness about 
the negative consequences of not saving for retirement (Harrison et al., 2006).  Therefore, 
choosing to join a pension scheme would be a belated and not a proactive choice.  However, 
the automatic enrolment feature of KiwiSaver does get people to save for retirement as soon 
as they join the workforce.  Despite this earlier start to retirement savings, the reluctance to 
seek professional advice and uncertainty about investing are factors that could hinder the 
involvement level of KiwiSaver members in making proactive choices about their 
investment. 
 
Demographic Variables 
     A number of retirement planning studies have identified several demographic factors that 
may influence planning and saving for retirement.  Age has been shown to be correlated 
positively with planning for retirement (Baker & Haslem, 1974; Jacobs-Lawson, Hershey, & 
Neukam, 2004; Petkoska & Earl, 2009).  Women are also less likely to plan for retirement 
than men and are more risk averse when they do so (Bajtelsmit, Bernasek, & Jianakoplos, 
1999; Jacobs-Lawson et al., 2004).  Higher income is also associated with planning for 
retirement (Jacobs-Lawson et al., 2004).  Amounts saved for retirement are also influenced 
by education level, length of employment, and income (Yuh & DeVaney, 1996).  In a survey 
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on expectations about funding for retirement Ong (2009) reported that positive expectations 
on self-funded retirement increase with age, education, and stable employment and divorced 
women are more likely to expect to be welfare reliant.  Additionally, the presence of 
dependent children after retirement did not affect expectations, although it still had a 
negative impact on self-provision. 
     A good source of data on retirement plan asset allocation comes from the Employee 
Benefit Research Institute (EBRI).  EBRI was founded in 1978 to produce and analyse 
information about employee benefit programs in the United States.  Research on behavior of 
participants in 401(k) plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) have been 
particularly informative and are on-going since the institute was set up.  EBRI sources data 
from several large databases including the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a large 
triennial interview survey sponsored by the US government.  As an example of the large 
data sources EBRI draws on, the EBRI/ICI database includes statistical information on 23.4 
million 401(k) plan participants who are in over 60,000 plans holding just over $1.4 trillion 
in assets. 
     Using data from the SCF, four general asset categories are defined for IRA and 401(k) 
plan type participants.  They are mostly or all in stocks, mostly or all in interest earning 
assets, a split between stock and interest earning assets, and other miscellaneous types of 
investment.  While Copeland (2004) recognises the informative limitations of this data, it 
does provide some general insights.  Excluding the ‘other’ category, investment in mostly 
stocks is the riskiest investment option of all four classes.  People who are well educated, 
high income earning, and young are more likely to invest in this option.  It should also be 
noted that, overall, the proportion of all participants in both IRA and 401(k) type plans 
investing in stocks has increased over the years from 1992 to 2004.  This increase occurred 
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during a period of strong economic growth, and it may be that strong returns in the stock 
market have attracted the investment of retirement funds. 
     VanDerhi, Holden, Alonso, and Bass (2011) used 401(k) data from the EBRI/ICI 
database to look at asset allocation and account balances in 2010.  Investment options were 
grouped into one of eight categories which are equity, bond, or balanced funds, company 
stock, money funds, guaranteed investment contracts, other (which includes property), and 
unknown.  Positive correlations were reported between the size of account balance and age 
and tenure with the employer, which served as a proxy for time spent in the 401(k) plan.  
While the aggregate data from VanDerhi (2011) show some clear patterns, it also hides 
significantly wide variation among the population.  For example, across all age groups, 
equity funds received the largest allocation with 42% of funds being allocated on average.  
However, 47% of individuals had no equity funds and 16% had more than 80% allocated.  
Therefore, only 37% of individuals allocated between 0% and 80% of their funds to an 
equity fund. 
     VanDerhi et al. (2011) also documented an increase in the popularity of target-date 
balanced funds.  These are similar to the life stages fund offered by some KiwiSaver 
providers where asset allocations are gradually shifted away from riskier equity funds as the 
member ages.  These target-date balanced funds are growing in popularity, particularly with 
younger people, with 49% of participants in their 20’s holding target-date funds compared 
with 28% in their 60’s.  Recently hired employees are also more likely to invest in some 
form of balanced fund and were also more likely to concentrate their allocations into such 
funds with 70% holding more than 90% of their account balance in them. 
     Similar results were also reported by Copeland (2011) who analysed the EBRI IRA 
database.  This has information on 14.1 million accounts of 11.1 million individuals with 
$732.9 billion of assets as of 2008.  Individual retirement accounts in 2008 accounted for 
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approximately 25% of all pre-retirement assets in the USA.  Five asset categories were used 
in the analysis; equity, bond, money, balanced funds, and other.  Across the database, 38.5% 
was invested in equities, 22.3% in money funds, 13.6% in bonds, 12.1% in balanced funds, 
and 13.6% in other.  Copeland (2011) reported females had a higher proportion invested in 
balanced funds while males tended to diversify more and allocate more to the other 
category.  Individuals aged less than 45 years were more likely to allocate to equities and 
balanced funds whilst individuals aged over 45 allocated more to bonds and other.  Also, as 
the size of the account increased, the allocation to equities and balanced funds declined.  
Copeland (2011) also reported tremendous variation existed around the aggregate means.  
For example, 30% of individuals held more than 90% of the accounts in equity funds. 
     The major limitation with the studies by VanDerhi et al. (2011) and Copeland (2011) is 
that they are a snapshot of the overall state of 401(k) and IRA account balances.  Although 
VanDerhi et al. (2011) was able to track trends in asset allocation over 14 years, it still 
focused on aggregate changes, and there was no information on changes of individual 
accounts.  A longitudinal study by Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003) looked at nearly 
7,000 401(k) accounts from a single plan over four years from 1994 to 1998.  They reported 
average annual allocation to equities was 47.6%, but there was a lot of variation.  The 
analysis resulted in a bimodal distribution with 48% and 22% of individuals allocating 0% 
and 100% of their accounts in equity funds respectively, a similar pattern of results to that 
reported by VanDerhi et al. (2011) and Copeland (2011).  Despite the wide variation, the 
results showed higher allocations to investments in shares were more likely among men, 
married investors, and high income earners, while age made investors more cautious about 
investing in equities.  Furthermore, little trading activity was reported indicating a lot of 
inertia or apathy among investors across all demographics. 
     In summary, the demographic patterns from pension plan studies show that people who 
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are well-educated, high income earning, young and male tend to invest more in equities.  
Target-date funds are also becoming a popular option among younger people.  However, 
there is a lot of variation around asset allocation and inertia towards rebalancing investment 
portfolios. 
 
Risk and Uncertainty 
     When it comes to measuring risk, a distinction needs to be made between general risk 
and contextual risk.  General risk refers to an individual’s propensity to take risk in many 
aspects of their life.  By contrast, contextual risk means that an individual may be willing to 
take risks in only in certain settings or contexts.  Aspects of the situation, the individual, and 
the social setting can all combine to influence the perception and tolerance of risk (Bem, 
1971).  Furthermore measures of risk can be influenced by how the situation or context is 
framed (Slovic, 1972; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 1992). 
     Related to risk is the concept of uncertainty.  Risk is involved where the evaluation of 
probabilities is possible.  In contrast, situations involving uncertainty are where probabilities 
cannot be estimated with any reasonable accuracy (Warneryd, 2001).  Investment choices in 
KiwiSaver can involve both risk and uncertainty.  Choosing between investment funds can 
involve comparing the risks of investing in various asset classes and trading off between risk 
and expected return.  However, there is uncertainty surrounding length of retirement and the 
funds needed to support a comfortable standard of living.  Therefore, a decision between a 
growth fund invested in equities or a conservative income fund may reflect either the risks 
assessed, or the uncertainty of whether higher returns from the growth fund are needed. 
     Uncertainty can also surround the design of the scheme and has been shown to be a factor 
of concern among individuals planning for retirement, although it has often been described 
as another form of risk (Rickwood & White, 2009).  Despite the distinction between risk and 
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uncertainty, most KiwiSaver scheme providers focus on the variable of risk tolerance of 
investors because it is a quantifiable measure that can be used to recommend an appropriate 
investment fund. 
     A general measure of risk developed by Zuckerman (1994) is the Sensation Seeking 
Scale and is a common scale that is used to measure an individual’s tendency to take risks.  
Sensation seeking is defined as the need for varied, novel, and complex experiences, with a 
willingness to take various physical and psychological risks for the sake of those 
experiences (Zuckerman, 1994).  Sensation seeking correlates with gambling, vocational 
choice, financial transactions, stock market investment, high risk recreation, and high risk 
investment, making it a well-established measure of general risk taking (Hunter & Kemp, 
2004; Zuckerman, 1994, 2007).  The 19-item Impulsiveness Sensation Seeking scale, while 
shorter than the 40-item Sensation Seeking Scale-version V, consists of questions that are 
more general and do not refer to specific activities (Zuckerman, 1994).  The Impulsiveness 
Sensation Seeking scale has been shown to correlate well with the sensation seeking scale-
version V (r = .66) making it a brief but still acceptable measure of sensation seeking in 
general (Zuckerman, 2007). 
     Grable and Lytton (1998) identify four factors to be considered in modern investment 
management decision making models.  They are goals, time horizon, financial stability, and 
risk tolerance.  The first three factors are objective and fairly easy to measure.  Goals are the 
plans that the investment principal and its returns will be used for.  Considering that the 
goals of KiwiSaver are to provide income for retirement, they can be subject to uncertainty 
as previously discussed.  Time horizon is the length of time before the investment is 
withdrawn to achieve the goals, which can be uncertain because the retirement age may 
change.  Financial stability refers to the nature and stability, or uncertainty, of the investor’s 
employment, their assets, liabilities, and net worth.  Grable and Lytton (1998) argue that the 
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final factor of risk tolerance is subjective and is the ability of the investor to tolerate the 
variability of investment returns.  This emphasises the investor’s attitudes and emotional 
tolerance towards risk.  Another definition could be the rate at which investors are prepared 
to trade off risk and return.  As risk tolerance rises, investors are more prepared to accept a 
smaller increase in expected return as compensation for an increase in risk. 
     Grable and Lytton (1998) fail adequately to take into account the distinction between risk 
and uncertainty when modelling investment management decisions.  They consider goals 
and time horizon to be fixed despite the uncertainty that can surround them in some cases.  
As a result they identify only risk tolerance as an important topic of research. 
     Anbar and Eker (2010) argue that the most common form of assessing financial risk 
tolerance is a questionnaire that asks questions about hypothetical scenarios or investment 
choices.  Other methods include assessing actual behavior in asset allocations, asking 
questions about investment choices, and asking a combination of investment and subjective 
questions.  They also note that financial risk tolerance is a complex attitude and while a 
questionnaire can be used to measure this construct it should be developed in accordance 
with psychological principles. 
     While financial risk tolerance can be measured objectively, the tendency is to view the 
construct as subjective and to use demographic characteristics to distinguish between 
different levels of financial risk tolerance (Anbar & Eker, 2010; Grable & Lytton, 1998; 
Warneryd, 1999).  Previous research has shown that gender, education level, employment 
status, and level of income, (but not marital status, dependants or age), can effectively 
discriminate between individuals that vary in their level of risk tolerance (Anbar & Eker, 
2010; Grable & Lytton, 1998).  While these variables are effective discriminators of risk 
tolerance, their predictive validity and independence have not been assessed.  For example, 
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gender, education level, and employment status all correlate with income, which could 
mediate the relationship between these variables and risk tolerance. 
     Survey data that assesses the subjective risk level of investors can be contradictory 
depending on the measures used to assess risk levels (Warneryd, 2001).  Some studies have 
reported subjective risk attitudes to have no predictive value (Morse, 1998; Warneryd, 
1996).  However, other studies have reported no predictive value of risk attitudes (Harlow & 
Brown, 1990; Hunter & Kemp, 2004; Warneryd, 2001).  These contradictory results can be 
explained by the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991).  According to the theory, risk 
attitudes are just one variable which affects intention, which in turn affects behavior.  There 
are other factors, like perceived behavioral control, that may lessen the intention to engage 
in risky investment behavior.  The implications for studying KiwiSaver, and other 
investment situations, are that other variables apart from risk attitudes should be included in 
the analysis of investment behavior. 
 
Financial Knowledge 
     Knowledge of financial matters can have an influence on investment and saving 
behavior.  For example, Perry and Morris (2005) reported that the propensity to save and be 
fiscally responsible was associated with financial knowledge.  Jacobs-Lawson and Hershey 
(2005) reported increased knowledge of financial planning for retirement was associated 
with positive retirement saving practices.  Financial knowledge has also been associated 
with risk acceptance, reflecting the possibility that increased risk acceptance may be the 
result of being well informed about financial matters (Warneryd, 2001). 
     In a study of 3386 mutual fund investors, Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996) studied 
self-report survey data and reported that the majority of investors are largely uninformed 
about their investments.  Only a small proportion (4%) was highly knowledgeable.  Agnew 
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and Szykman (2005) report investors with low levels of financial knowledge were more 
likely to select the default allocation in defined contribution plans.  This is not necessarily an 
irrational decision because low knowledge investors choosing to invest heavily in equities 
may make significant errors in their investment decisions.  Yakoboski and Dickemper 
(1997) report three-quarters of workers in the United States had no idea of how much was 
needed to save for retirement and 30% were not confident they were saving enough.  
Although 25% of workers felt very confident they were saving enough, only 55% of these 
indicated they had actually calculated that their savings would be sufficient. 
     Financial education through seminars on saving for retirement can have an effect on 
planning for retirement.  Financial education seminars increases participation in, and 
contributions to, pension plans, especially when they are offered frequently (Bayer, 
Bernheim, & Scholz, 2009).  They also tend to have a greater effect among low and 
moderate savers (Bernheim & Garret, 2003) and women (Clark, d'Ambrosio, McDermed, & 
Sawant, 2006). 
     In a review of the literature on the effect of financial education on retirement savings, 
Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002) reported a strong effect on intentions to change 
saving habits, but this did not translate well into actual change.  For example, Clark et al. 
(2006) reported that, after being educated about retirement savings, 91% of individuals 
indicated that they planned to make some changes.  A follow up survey three months later 
assessed the translation from intention to action.  Only 25% of individuals planning to open 
a pension account did so, while 63% said they were still planning to.  For individuals who 
already had an account and planned to increase their contributions, only 42% had made the 
change. 
     Other studies have reported that financial knowledge did not necessarily result in better 
investment decisions.  For example, Bodnarak and Simonov (2012) studied the investments 
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of a group of experts, mutual fund managers.  They report that the investment portfolios of 
fund managers did not significantly perform better, nor did they diversify more.  Grinblatt, 
Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2011) reported that measurement of the Intelligence Quotient 
(IQ) was a very important predictor of participation in the stock market, mutual funds, and 
diversification of assets.  Therefore, it is possible that financial knowledge is not necessarily 
related to investment decisions, rather it is the intelligence of individuals that determines 
what is done with that knowledge.  For example, it may take someone with a high IQ to 
comprehend the information about investing taught in a financial education seminar, and to 
then be able to make an informed change in investment behavior. 
 
Default Rules 
     The default rules in a retirement plan can have a significant impact on the participation 
rates, contribution levels, and asset allocation within the plan.  A seminal study by Madrian 
and Shea (2001) examined the effects of changes in a 401(k) plan from opting into the plan 
to opting out of the plan after being automatically enrolled.  They report that participation 
rates rose significantly from 37% of employees hired before the change to 86% of 
employees hired after the change.  Additionally, 76% of automatically enrolled employees 
contributed at the default rate of 3% compared with just 10% of participants who opted in 
before the change.  Default asset allocation consisted of investing 100% of contributions 
made into a money market fund.  Before the change to automatic enrolment, approximately 
10% of contributions were allocated to this type of fund, but after automatic enrolment was 
introduced, 80% of contributions from new employees were allocated to the default fund.  
While the introduction of automatic enrolment significantly increased participation in a 
401(k) retirement plan, the default rules of the scheme meant that a significant majority of 
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new employees who were automatically enrolled remain invested in the conservative plan 
chosen for them (Madrian & Shea, 2001). 
     A review of the empirical evidence on the impact of default rules by Beshears, Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian (2009) confirms the significant influence default rules have at each 
stage of the savings lifecycle, including plan participation, contributions, and asset 
allocation.  Explanations for the impact of default rules include choice paralysis, a bias to 
the status quo, endorsement effects, or the framing of 401(k) participation decision 
(Beshears et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2002; Madrian & Shea, 2001; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 
1988). 
     The way participation in a retirement savings plan is framed could explain the significant 
increase in enrolments under an automatic enrolment system (Madrian & Shea, 2001).  
Before automatic enrolment, non-participation is viewed as the default whereas under 
automatic enrolment participation is now the default.  However, while this can explain the 
increased participation rates it does not explain why default rules have a significant impact 
on contribution rates and asset allocation. 
      A bias to the status quo can be viewed as the result of procrastination by new 
participants who are automatically enrolled.  Preference for staying with the status quo can 
be explained by participants following the path of least resistance (Choi et al., 2002).  
Evidence for this comes from Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) who reported preference 
for the status quo tends to increase with the number of alternatives.  In other words, as the 
cost of evaluating alternatives increases, it becomes more attractive to simply accept the 
default. 
     Choice paralysis can arise from the increased complexity of choices in a retirement plan 
scheme.  Participants not only choose whether to enrol in one but they also have the choice 
of how much they want to contribute and how to allocate their contributions among various 
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funds and assets.  Assessing the large array of options available may not only be a time 
consuming task, but there is also the added complexity of newly hired young employees 
lacking the knowledge to be able to understand and distinguish between various funds on 
offer (Beshears et al., 2009; Madrian & Shea, 2001). 
     A lack of financial knowledge can result in participants viewing the default options as an 
endorsement by the plan provider as the best option for them.  In their review of the 
literature on defaults, Beshears et al. (2009) report that, for participants who choose to move 
away from their default allocations, many still continue to invest a significant portion of 
their assets in their given default fund.  Therefore, even when individuals choose their own 
investment plans after being automatically enrolled, there is still a preference to keep some 
contributions invested in the option that was previously assigned to them by their plan 
provider. 
     Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) reported the power of default rules can be diminished but 
not extinguished.  They studied the privatisation of Swedish pension plans which allowed 
participants to create a portfolio by investing their contributions in up to five funds from 
over 400 that were available.  One fund was chosen to be a default fund for individuals that 
did not make a choice.  An advertising campaign was run to encourage active choice of 
funds and to discourage investment in the default fund.  The advertisement campaign had an 
effect with two-thirds of participants choosing their own portfolio.  However, after the initial 
enrolment period, the advertising efforts by both the government and the funds attempting to 
attract new investors were significantly reduced.  Corresponding with this drop in 
advertisements the number of individuals actively choosing their own portfolio dropped to 
8.4 percent.  These new members to the pension plan, after the advertising campaign, were 
largely young workers new to the workforce.  In comparison, a comparable group of 
individuals aged less than 22 years when the plan was first launched chose their own 
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portfolio 57 percent of the time.  This study shows how the impact of defaults can be 
diminished by making an effort to inform new participants about their options.  However, 
the effect is only temporary, and in the absence of an information campaign the influence of 
default rules reappears, even if the majority of existing participants are not enrolled in the 
default option. 
 
Personal Advice 
     Communications between individuals engaged in the investment of the same financial 
service can have an influence on behavior.  Shiller and Pound (1989) used questionnaire 
surveys to study the communication patterns of investors in the US stock market.  They 
report that direct interpersonal communications are considered to be very important in 
investor decisions.  In a random sample of individual investors, 28% were influenced to buy 
stock based on the fact that they knew someone who had previously bought that same stock.  
This figure increased to 44% of individual investors that had bought stock that had rapidly 
increased in price.  Furthermore, investors who bought stock that rapidly increased in price 
were more likely to be influenced by friends and family and less likely by professional 
stockbrokers. 
     The influence of peers can have an effect on purchases of services.  Enrolment in 
retirement plans can be considered the purchase of a financial service (Harrison et al., 2006; 
Rickwood & White, 2009).  Murray (1991) reported that, when purchases of services as 
opposed to goods are made, individuals are more likely to prefer personal sources over 
impersonal sources.  Personal sources were also more likely to be considered more effective 
and more confidence was placed in them. 
     In a study using focus groups of members in occupational pension schemes, Harrison et 
al. (2006) reported that, despite the recognised need for guidance about retirement plans, 
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there seemed to be a reluctance to seek expert advice.  Instead, participants highlighted a 
tendency to consult with a range of personal sources despite their biased and unbalanced 
nature.  Duflo and Saez (2002) examined the influence peers have in retirement savings 
decisions among staff at a university in the United States.  They recognised the limitation 
that decisions in a social group may correlate for a variety of reasons, like similar tastes, 
backgrounds or common environmental factors which have no relation to individuals 
imitating each other.  Nevertheless, they report that participation and choice of mutual fund 
vendor was correlated with participation rates within subgroups in departments, which were 
distinguished along lines of gender, tenure, status, and age.  These correlations existed only 
within the subgroups analysed showing that participation and mutual fund vendor choice 
from different subgroups did not have an influence. 
     This preference for personal sources of information reflects the factor of social norms in 
the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991).  If an individual perceives that it is a norm 
among their peer group to invest their retirement savings in a particular fund then this could 
affect their intention to make the same investment decision, especially if they trust the 
judgement of their friends and family. 
 
Professional Financial Advice 
     As mentioned before, professional advice was not commonly sought by individuals 
planning for their retirement, instead they relied on advice from friends and family (Duflo & 
Saez, 2002; Harrison et al., 2006; Rickwood & White, 2009).  Chalmers and Reuter (2012) 
studied participants within the Oregon University System’s defined contribution retirement 
plan and analysed who was most likely to seek face-to-face professional advice.  They also 
examined the effect this advice had on portfolio asset allocations.  They reported that 
individuals who sought professional advice tended to be younger, less highly educated, and 
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less highly paid, which is characteristic of individuals who are less financially literate.  
Individuals who did seek the advice of brokers tended to have portfolios that were moved 
out of the default and invested in funds with higher than average past returns, and with 
higher than average exposure to various forms of market risk which reflected the 
recommendations of their brokers. 
     Using KiwiSaver data from New Zealand, Zhang (2013) examined the investments of 
approximately 400,000 members, of whom about 40,000 had sought financial advice.  
Zhang (2013) reported that, consistent with previous studies, those who sought professional 
advice tended to be women and wealthy.  Surprisingly, young investors also tended to seek 
advice, contrary to what was expected.  Additionally, investors that sought the advice of a 
financial advisor had their exposure to risky assets increased, but the influence on returns 
was minimal.  This could be due to the trend of more conservative funds producing the best 
returns over the last few years, although recent trends indicate that the growth funds are 
starting to perform better (Morningstar, 2012). 
     Zhang (2013) argued that younger investors could be seeking advice because they are 
less informed, or they want to make an informed decision about their investment fund 
choice.  These arguments are plausible considering the automatic enrolment feature of 
KiwiSaver would have enrolled many young people into a retirement savings scheme before 
they may have considered saving for retirement themselves. 
 
Fees and Performance 
     Two other factors that can affect the flow of funds to and from various pension schemes 
are the performance of the scheme, measured by returns, and its cost or fees.  Evidence 
shows that funds that perform well tend to attract higher inflows of assets from investors 
(Agnew et al., 2003; Barber, Odean, & Zheng, 2005; Kempf & Ruenzi, 2008; Sirri & 
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Tufano, 1998).  However, Agnew et al. (2003) reported that, although investors are attracted 
to well performing funds, they cannot time the market.  In a longitudinal study of nearly 
7,000 401(k) accounts, they report daily changes in equity allocations correlated weakly 
with same day equity returns, and did not correlate at all with future equity returns. 
     In addition to fund performance, the effect of perceptions of the fund by other trusted 
sources can also influence fund flow.  Del Guercio and Tkac (2008) examined the influence 
of fund performance ratings from Morningstar.  They analysed approximately 10,000 star 
rating changes of mutual funds.  An increase in the five-star rating attracted investment, 
while a downgrade deterred investment.  This influence was independent of the actual 
performance of the fund itself.  Because Morningstar rates KiwiSaver funds on a similar five 
star rating and publish performance data, this could influence KiwiSaver investment fund 
decisions for individuals that choose their fund based on its performance. 
     While high performing funds succeed in attracting investors, poor performing funds do 
not see a proportionate exodus of assets and investors (Del Guercio & Tkac, 2002; Sirri & 
Tufano, 1998).  Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) reported that this disproportionate flow differs 
when pension funds are compared with non-pension mutual funds.  Investors in pension 
funds are more likely to punish poor performance by withdrawing their funds, but do not 
necessarily invest in the better performing funds of the previous years.  Thomas and 
Matthews (2012) reported that KiwiSaver members chase the good performance of scheme 
providers.  While the focus was on provider membership, it was recognised that introducing 
more variables and taking a fund by fund approach could yield greater insight into 
KiwiSaver investor behavior. 
     The fees incurred in fund investment can influence investors, with high fees tending to 
deter investment and low fees attracting investment (Barber et al., 2005; Sirri & Tufano, 
1998).  However, different types of fees vary in their influence on investors.  For example, 
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Sirri and Tufano (1998) compared the effects of operating expenses and more salient front-
end load fees, which is essentially an establishment fee.  They report a negative relation 
between inflows of funds and front-end load fees.  In contrast there was no relationship 
between fund flows and operating expenses.  Sirri and Tufano (1998) argue that the drain of 
operating expenses may be masked by the volatility of the fund.  Another explanation by 
Barber et al. (2005) is that the negative effect of expense fees is often offset when these fees 
are spent on marketing efforts to attract customers. 
 
Banks and Advertising 
     A common reason given for the choice of KiwiSaver provider by individuals is that it is 
preferable to have their KiwiSaver account with their main bank (Matthews, 2011).  There 
was some evidence supporting the preference for KiwiSaver members to invest in banks.  
Excluding the default funds, which capture a significantly large amount of the KiwiSaver 
market, the top scheme provider is Westpac Bank with approximately $1.7 billion of assets 
under management, making it the third largest provider overall (Morningstar, 2012). 
     Frye (2001) reported that, although bank managed mutual funds do not tend to 
underperform; they do follow a more conservative investment strategy, produce returns that 
are less volatile, and are more likely to target individual investors.  As previously noted, 
there is a relationship between past performance and the attraction of investment.  However, 
there is no relationship between past performance and flow of investment in bank managed 
funds (Frye, 2001; Knuutila, Puttonen, & Smythe, 2007).  Frye (2001) argues that investors 
often rely on the general reputation of the bank, and are less likely to pay attention to 
abnormal performance of bank managed funds. 
     Advertising and marketing of mutual funds are successful in attracting inflows of 
investors (Barber et al., 2005; Jain & Wu, 2000; Kaniel, Starks, & Vasudevan, 2007; 
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Korkeamaki, Puttonen, & Smythe, 2007).  Funds most likely to have media coverage are 
more likely to be larger, have extreme performance, either good or bad, or produce more 
volatile returns (Kaniel et al., 2007).  Korkeamaki et al. (2007) reported that the independent 
effect of advertisements on mutual fund cash flows in the Finnish market was not enough to 
attract investment.  It was only in conjunction with superior past performance that 
advertisements attracted investment. 
 
Summary of Factors Affecting KiwiSaver Fund Choice 
     Although a model of KiwiSaver fund choice has not previously been developed, the 
literature does suggest several factors that could have an influence.  Other models of 
retirement savings provide a guide of which variables could have a stronger influence on 
fund choice (Harrison et al., 2006; Rickwood & White, 2009).  However, the applicability of 
these models may be limited in the context of studying KiwiSaver fund choice.  For 
example, the KiwiSaver scheme design includes automatic enrolment and the use of default 
rules, factors that are not considered in models that focus on factors behind an active choice 
of entering a retirement plan. 
     Despite this limitation, the literature does suggest that demographics, risk attitudes, levels 
of financial knowledge, default rules, recommendations from friends and family, advice 
from financial advisors, previous performance, fees, the reputable brand effect of banks, and 
advertising may all have various levels of influence on fund choice.  Exploring the strength 
of influence each factor has on KiwiSaver choice is the purpose of this exploratory study. 
     Drawing on the information in the literature, the following hypotheses are made with 
respect to fund choice. 
     Hypothesis 1:  The most common reasons given for current investment fund choice 
should be influenced by; (a) the powerful effect of default rules (Beshears et al., 2009; Choi 
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et al., 2002; Madrian & Shea, 2001), (b) it best matches individual risk level (Warneryd, 
2001; Zuckerman, 2007), and (c) recommendations by friends and family (Harrison et al., 
2006; Murray, 1991; Rickwood & White, 2009). 
     Hypothesis 2:  A large proportion of respondents are expected to be invested in 
conservative type funds, be less likely to invest in growth or aggressive type funds, and to 
contribute at the default minimum contribution rate. 
     Hypothesis 3:  Scores on the Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale, Investor Risk Attitude 
scale, and KiwiSaver Risk Profile should be correlated with investment fund type, with risk 
tolerant investors more likely to invest in riskier growth type funds and risk averse investors 
more likely to invest in less risky conservative funds (Warneryd, 2001; Zuckerman, 2007). 
     Hypothesis 4:  Better knowledge about the KiwiSaver scheme should be correlated with 
investment in riskier growth type funds (Agnew & Szykman, 2005). 
     Hypothesis 5:  Some demographic factors should be correlated with investment fund 
type.  Specifically, respondents who are male, highly educated, earn a high income, and the 
young should be more likely to invest in riskier growth funds (Bajtelsmit et al., 1999; 
Copeland, 2004, 2011; VanDerhi et al., 2011). 
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CHAPTER 3:  METHOD 
 
Survey Design 
     The survey consisted of a section asking about other investment and saving plans in 
addition to KiwiSaver that respondents may have, and information about their KiwiSaver 
account.  This was followed by a section assessing knowledge of the KiwiSaver scheme, and 
scales assessing knowledge and perceived risk of investment in four investment asset classes 
commonly invested in by KiwiSaver scheme providers.  This was followed by a KiwiSaver 
Investor Profile, an Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale, and an Investment Risk Attitude 
scale.  The survey concluded with questions on the demographic variables of the 
respondents. 
 
Recruitment and Characteristics of Respondents 
Recruitment 
     The survey was circulated in both hard copy paper form, and online using the survey 
software package, Qualtrics (found at http://www.qualtrics.com/).  Surveys were circulated 
around various local businesses for their employees to answer.  Paper questionnaires, and 
links to the online survey were also circulated around individuals in the general population 
who, in addition to filling out their own survey, were encouraged to get other people to fill 
them out.  A total of 134 respondents answered the surveys, which included 87 members of 
KiwiSaver and 47 non-members. 
Demographics 
     Questions on age, gender, and relationship status, number of children, education level, 
employment status and income were asked at the end of the survey.  Each question had a 
refuse to answer option for those who did not feel comfortable answering, despite the 
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anonymous nature of the survey.  Table 3.1 shows the demographics of respondents for both 
members and non-members of KiwiSaver. 
Table 3.1 
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
Age % of 
members 
% of non-
members 
Under 20 1.1 2.1 
20-29 26.4 14.9 
30-39 19.5 12.8 
40-49 19.5 23.4 
50-59 12.6 29.8 
60-65 10.3 8.5 
66 or over 8.0 6.4 
Refuse to answer 2.3 2.1 
Gender   
Male 49.4 66.0 
Female 49.4 31.9 
Refuse to answer 1.1 2.1 
Relationship status   
Single 26.4 14.9 
Married 55.2 66.0 
De facto 14.9 6.4 
Divorced 1.1 6.4 
Widowed 0 2.1 
Refuse to answer 2.3 4.3 
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Table 3.1 continued   
Dependants   
None 63.2 57.4 
One 9.2 10.6 
Two 21.8 14.9 
Three or more 4.6 14.9 
Refuse to answer 1.1 2.1 
Level of education   
No formal 
qualification 
0 0 
Secondary school 
qualification 
10.3 19.1 
Vocational 
qualification 
14.9 8.5 
Bachelor’s degree 25.3 31.9 
Higher degree 27.6 21.3 
Doctorate 19.5 14.9 
Refuse to answer 2.3 4.3 
Employment status   
Unemployed 0 4.3 
Part time 29.9 12.8 
Full time 65.5 70.2 
Self employed 0 8.5 
Retired 3.4 2.1 
Refuse to answer 1.1 2.1 
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Table 3.1 continued  
Earnings per annum  
$0 – $29,999 18.4 12.8 
$30,000 - $59,999 27.6 6.4 
$60,000 - $89,999 17.2 31.9 
$90,000 - $119,999 13.8 10.6 
$120,000 - 
$149,999 
6.9 6.4 
$150,000 + 6.9 10.6 
Refuse to answer 9.1 17.0 
Not answered
a
  4.3 
a
These respondents were unemployed. 
     There were no significant differences between members and non-members with respect 
to any of the demographic variables measured.  A significant number are working part time, 
but this is likely to reflect the sampling methods which would have disproportionately 
captured a subset of the general population, which is students, who are working part time 
and were enrolled automatically into KiwiSaver.  A further breakdown of the sample shows 
58% of part time workers are aged 20-29, or alternatively, 65% of 20-29 year olds are 
working part time.  The question on earnings per annum was the most sensitive, with twelve 
percent refusing to answer. 
 
KiwiSaver Questionnaire 
     The questionnaire was preceded by an information sheet informing respondents about the 
aim of the study, and that anonymity for the respondent will be preserved.  The information 
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sheet can be viewed in Appendix A.  This was followed by the survey questionnaire which 
can be viewed in Appendix B. 
KiwiSaver Information 
     The first question asked respondents to select from a range of options listed in Table 3.2, 
other investments or savings plans that they held.  Both members and non-members of 
KiwiSaver answered this question.  The next question asked respondents if they were in 
KiwiSaver.  If they answered “no”, respondents were instructed to skip the rest of the 
section on KiwiSaver information and proceed to the ‘knowledge about KiwiSaver’ section. 
Table 3.2 
Other Investments and Saving Plans Held 
Bank Term deposit 
Commercial rental properties 
Directly owned shares in public companies  
Investment with a finance company 
Residential rental properties 
Unit trusts or other managed fund investments 
Workplace superannuation scheme 
Other 
None of the above 
 
    KiwiSaver members were asked what year they were enrolled in the scheme, who their 
provider was, what type of fund they were invested in, and the main reason they were 
currently invested in that fund.  Because of the variability in naming conventions and asset 
allocations of various funds offered by scheme providers, respondents were asked what type 
of fund best described their current investment fund.  The options for type of fund invested 
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in are given in Table 3.3 and were taken from a description of the types of funds available 
on the KiwiSaver website. 
Table 3.3 
Types of KiwiSaver Fund Invested In 
Cash (low risk) Bank deposits and other fixed interest investments 
Conservative (low 
  to medium risk) 
A high proportion in bank deposits and fixed interest investments, and 
a lower proportion in growth assets such as shares and property 
Balanced 
  (medium risk) 
A more equal split between higher risk growth assets such as shares 
and property, and more stable investments including fixed interest and 
bank deposits 
Growth (medium 
  to high risk) 
A high proportion of shares and property with a lower level of bank 
deposits and fixed interest 
Aggressive (high 
  risk) 
Mainly shares 
Lifetimes option Adjusts an investor's allocations to the five main asset classes based on 
his or her specific length of time to the standard New Zealand 
Superannuation qualification age (currently 65) 
Note. Adapted from http://www.kiwisaver.govt.nz/providers/about/funds/ 
     A list of the main reasons for current investment in a KiwiSaver fund is given in Table 
3.4.  A common theme running through these reasons is that they are all apparent salient 
factors which can affect fund choice.  With the exception of being placed into a default fund, 
the other reasons could be consciously considered by respondents.  Advertising and the 
scheme provider being a main bank reflected the reputation of the scheme.  
Recommendations by family, friends, or financial advisors reflected the influence of 
opinions and arguments from other people, while low fees and good performance reflect 
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specific aspects of a particular fund.  Matching risk level is included because scheme 
providers will often provide a measure of risk scale on their websites, or in their investment 
statements, and responses to scores on these scales may prompt members to choose a fund 
based on their risk level. 
Table 3.4 
Main Reasons for Investment in Current Fund 
It was the fund you were allocated by the IRD 
It was the fund you were allocated by your employer 
The fund best matches your level of preferred risk 
The scheme provider is your main bank 
It was recommended to you by a family member or close friend 
It has comparatively low fees 
It was recommended by a financial advisor 
Advertising 
It has a proven historical performance of giving good returns 
Other 
 
     Respondents were asked how many times they changed their investment allocation 
between different funds.  Answers could range from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 
five or more.  A question on contribution level allowed respondents to answer zero, two, 
four or eight percent of their gross wage or salary.  If respondents answered zero percent 
they were instructed to answer the next question on why they were contributing zero 
percent, otherwise they skipped to the next question asking if they made any additional 
contributions.  The reasons given for contributing zero percent could be; taking a 
contributions holiday, significant financial hardship, serious illness, or unemployment.  
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Finally, respondents were asked how often they checked their KiwiSaver account balance 
with answers ranging on a scale from never to once a week.  The last question asked if 
KiwiSaver savings were going to be used for a house purchase. 
Knowledge about KiwiSaver 
     Eight questions, shown in Table 3.5, asked respondents about their knowledge of the 
design of KiwiSaver and its benefits.  Four were multiple choice questions, while the other 
four were open response questions.  Respondents were free to answer that they were 
‘unsure’ or ‘did not know’ for the open response questions, and an ‘unsure’ option was 
provided for the multiple choice questions. 
Table 3.5 
KiwiSaver Knowledge Questions 
After how many years can you make a savings withdrawal to put towards buying a first 
     home?
a
 
What can be withdrawn to put towards buying a first home?
b
 
What is the maximum amount of the first home deposit subsidy?
a
 
After how many months since beginning making contributions to KiwiSaver can members 
     take a contribution holiday without a reason?
a
 
How many years can the maximum length of a contribution holiday be?
a
 
Are you able to permanently leave the KiwiSaver scheme after being a member for more 
     than eight weeks?
b
 
Who do you contact if you want to change to another KiwiSaver scheme?
b
 
Who do you contact to keep track of your overall KiwiSaver balance?
b
 
a
Open questions 
b
Multiple choice questions 
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     Questions on the KiwiSaver knowledge scale were scored one for correct and zero for 
incorrect.  Scores on the KiwiSaver knowledge scale could therefore range from a minimum 
of zero to a maximum of eight. 
     This was followed by scales on self-rated knowledge, and perceived risk of investment 
about four investment asset classes that are commonly invested in by the majority of funds 
offered by KiwiSaver scheme providers.  The investment asset classes are shares, property, 
fixed interest, and term deposits.  The knowledge of the investment classes was self-assessed 
on a five point scale ranging from poor (1) to excellent (5).  Perceived risk of investment 
was rated on a five point likert scale from very low risk (1) to very high risk (5). 
KiwiSaver Scheme Risk Profile 
     The KiwiSaver Scheme Risk Profile questionnaire is a four question scale measuring 
specific risk attitudes to investing in KiwiSaver.  It was sourced from the websites of 
scheme providers ANZ, OnePath, and National Bank.  Combined, these three providers have 
the most KiwiSaver members and assets under management (Morningstar, 2012).  
Therefore, the scale is likely to be the most widely used risk profile questionnaire used by 
KiwiSaver members.  It was included to check convergent validity with other scales 
measuring risk and to test its internal reliability and predictive validity about investment 
fund choice.  Four questions were asked about investment objectives, attitudes, risk 
tolerance to losses, and knowledge surrounding financial investments.  Answers were scored 
on a five point scale from the most conservative response (1) to the least conservative (5) 
response.  Scores could therefore range from a minimum of four for the most conservative 
investor, to a maximum of twenty for the least conservative.  A supplementary question 
asking if a similar risk profile questionnaire had been taken before was added to assess the 
prevalence of KiwiSaver members taking these short risk attitude questionnaires. 
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Impulsiveness Sensation Seeking Scale 
     The Impulsiveness Sensation Seeking Scale consisted of nineteen true or false 
statements.  Responses were scored one for true, and zero for false, and the second and sixth 
questions were reversed scored.  Scores could range from a minimum of zero, to a maximum 
of nineteen.  This scale has good internal reliability coefficients ranging from .77 to .82 
among various reported studies (Zuckerman, 1994). 
Investment Risk Attitude Scale 
     The Investment Risk Attitude Scale is a subjective measure designed specifically to 
measure attitudes towards investment risk (Warneryd, 2001).  The Investment Risk Attitude 
Scale contains six items which were rated on a five point scale from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (5).  The first, second, and fourth items were reversed scored.  Scores can 
range from a minimum of six, to a maximum of thirty, with higher scores indicating lower 
levels of risk aversion.  This scale has good internal reliability with a Cronbach alpha of .83 
(Warneryd, 2001). 
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CHAPTER 4:  RESULTS 
     This chapter summarises the main survey findings about KiwiSaver investment fund 
choice.  The first section reports a summary of results from the survey.  This includes 
information comparing KiwiSaver members and non-members about extra assets, 
investments, and savings plans held, and the knowledge of investment in four investment 
asset classes and their perceived risk assessment of investment.   Information on the 
characteristics of KiwiSaver member investment and knowledge of KiwiSaver, including a 
comparison between members and non-members, is summarised next.  Finally, the summary 
results of the scores on the scales measuring investment risk and sensation seeking are 
reported.  The second section reports a series of correlational analyses.  Convergent validity 
of the risk scales are measured, and will be followed by analyses of demographic variables, 
and investment knowledge, and their relation to each other, risk level and fund choice.  The 
section finishes by presenting the results from the multiple regression analyses that assess 
the predictive validity of variables associated with investment fund type. 
 
Investment Behavior, Knowledge, and Perception of Risk 
     The main purpose of the KiwiSaver Act (2006) was to encourage a savings habit among 
those who need it.  As Figure 4.1 shows, KiwiSaver was the most popular form of 
investment held.  Bank term deposits were next followed by workplace superannuation 
schemes, shares in public companies, and other managed funds investments. 
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Figure 4.1. Respondents with other Investments and Saving Plans 
     A comparison of other investments and saving plans in Table 4.1 shows little difference 
between members and non-members in the types of other investments they held.  The 
biggest difference is that non-members were more likely to hold bank term deposits with 
55.3% for non-members, compared with 40.2% for members.  However, this was not 
statistically significant, t(132) = -1.54, p = .13.  This shows that KiwiSaver members were 
more likely to be savers anyway.  Furthermore, the similarities with non-members indicate 
that KiwiSaver represents new savings.  Also, approximately one-fifth of KiwiSaver 
members did not hold any additional investments or savings, making KiwiSaver their first 
significant saving or investment asset. 
 
64 
 
Table 4.1 
Comparison of Other Investment and Saving Plans 
Investment/saving plan Members Non-members 
Bank term deposit 40.2% 55.3% 
Workplace superannuation 
  scheme 
33.3% 38.3% 
Directly owned shares in 
  public companies 
24.1% 21.3% 
Unit trusts or other 
  managed fund investments 
26.4% 21.3% 
Residential rental properties 19.5% 14.9% 
Investment with a finance 
  company 
9.2% 10.6% 
Commercial rental 
  properties 
0.0% 6.4% 
Other 17.2% 17.0% 
None of the above 21.8% 14.9% 
 
     Two questions asked respondents about their knowledge and perceived risk of investment 
in four investment asset classes commonly invested in KiwiSaver portfolios; fixed interest, 
property, shares, and term deposits.  Table 4.2 shows the knowledge respondents had about 
four investment asset classes and the perceived risk of investment in them respectively.  
Knowledge of each asset class was self-rated on a five point scale from 1 (poor) through to 5 
(excellent).  Perceived risk of investment was rated on a five point scale from very low risk 
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(1) to very high risk (5).  Scores on both scales could range from a minimum of four to a 
maximum of twenty. 
     As Table 4.2 shows, members and non-members gave similar ratings for all four 
investment asset classes.  Respondents believed themselves to be more knowledgeable about 
term deposits and fixed interest, and also rated them as the least risky form of investment.  
Shares were rated as the riskiest form of investment followed by property.  Respondents 
appeared to feel knowledgeable about investment asset classes that they perceived as less 
risky, and knew less about assets they believed to be riskier.  An overall knowledge and 
perceived risk score was calculated by taking the mean average from each respondent.  The 
mean investment knowledge for members was 2.66 (SD=1.19) compared with 2.83 
(SD=1.00) for non-members.  The mean perceived investment risk was 2.64 (SD=0.43) and 
2.53 (SD=0.45) for members and non-members respectively.  The mean investment 
knowledge and mean perceived risk scores are not significantly different between members 
and non-members, t(130) = -0.906, p = .37, and t(130) = 1.310, p = .19 respectively.  The 
investment knowledge scale had good internal reliability with a Cronbach alpha of .89, 
while the perceived investment risk scale showed low internal reliability with a Cronbach 
alpha of .20.  This low value was most likely due to the significantly different ratings given 
between the riskier group of investment asset classes of property and shares and the less 
risky group of investment asset classes of term deposits and fixed interest. 
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Table 4.2 
Knowledge and Perceived Risk of Investment in Four Asset Classes 
 Knowledge Perceived Risk 
Asset Class Mean SD Mean SD 
 Members (n = 87) 
Fixed Interest 2.82 1.34 1.68 .80 
Property 2.41 1.24 3.13 .82 
Shares 2.40 1.32 4.11 .77 
Term Deposits 2.99 1.42 1.62 .83 
 Non-Members (n = 45) 
Fixed Interest 3.18 1.19 1.56 .84 
Property 2.60 1.21 2.89 .83 
Shares 2.33 1.26 4.11 .78 
Term Deposits 3.22 1.28 1.56 .87 
 
 
KiwiSaver Account Information 
     This section of the survey asked about respondent’s individual KiwiSaver information 
and assessed their level of involvement in managing their KiwiSaver account.  Figure 4.2 
displays choice of KiwiSaver provider.   A large proportion of respondents (49%) were 
enrolled with default KiwiSaver scheme providers AMP, ASB, AXA, OnePath, Mercer, or 
Tower.  The largest providers by membership were two default providers, ASB and 
OnePath, which shared 29% of members between them. 
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Figure 4.2. Choice of KiwiSaver Provider 
     Table 4.3 shows the type of fund members were invested in, and the main reasons why 
they were invested in that fund.  Some respondents (12.6%) were unsure about what fund 
type they were in.  A significant majority were invested in conservative and balanced type 
funds which invest primarily in cash, term deposits, and fixed interest securities.  There was 
also a large number invested in balanced funds which invest in a mixture of conservative 
income assets, of term deposits and fixed interest, and growth assets, of property and shares.  
Fewer respondents were invested in the growth and aggressive type funds which primarily 
invest primarily in riskier assets of shares and property.  This pattern could be due to the 
large number of members who were invested in their employers default scheme, or were 
allocated to it by the Inland Revenue.  Funds that matched member’s risk level, investment 
with a main bank, and recommendations from family and friends, were also popular reasons 
for choice of investment fund.  Three people thought they were in their balanced fund 
because the Inland Revenue allocated them that fund.  However, they appeared to 
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misunderstand the question because Inland Revenue only allocates new KiwiSaver members 
to a conservative fund if the member does not choose a fund.  Further analysis revealed that 
of these three respondents, two changed their KiwiSaver fund once and the third had 
changed it twice.  Therefore, the reason for being in their current fund must be different, and 
they incorrectly answered the question. 
     The popular reasons behind choice of KiwiSaver fund also show a tendency towards 
conservative investment.  For respondents that responded, the fund best matched their risk 
level, that the provider was a main bank, or that it was recommended by family or friends, 
the majority invested in either conservative or balanced type funds.  Therefore, even when 
KiwiSaver members were making an active choice of KiwiSaver fund they tended to choose 
a conservative investment option. 
     Table 4.4 presents the rest of the summary statistics on KiwiSaver investment 
information.   The majority of KiwiSaver members (59.3%) have joined the scheme early in 
the first two years of the schemes operation.  Respondents also appeared to be 
knowledgeable about their own KiwiSaver information with less than 10% responding to 
questions about with ‘unsure’.  Table 4.4 shows a tendency among KiwiSaver members to 
enrol early, contribute the default minimum rate, change their fund allocations rarely, check 
their account balance infrequently, and make few additional contributions. This could be a 
result of members being apathetic towards their involvement in managing KiwiSaver funds.  
Alternatively, the tendency of low management could be intentional as a result of a ‘buy and 
hold’ principle, where just participating in KiwiSaver is the main objective. 
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Table 4.4 
Summary Statistics on KiwiSaver Account Information 
Year Enrolled Frequency 
2007 34 
2008 17 
2009 9 
2010 8 
2011 7 
2012 5 
Unsure 6 
Not Answered 1 
Times fund changed Frequency 
0 69 
1 7 
2 4 
3 2 
4 0 
5 1 
Unsure 4 
Contribution rate Frequency 
0% 4 
2% 27 
4% 42 
8% 6 
Unsure 7 
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Table 4.4 continued  
Not answered 1 
Additional contributions Frequency 
Yes 9 
No 77 
Not answered 1 
Time spent checking balance Frequency 
Never 16 
Once per year 28 
Once per 6 months 16 
3-6 times per year 13 
Once per month 11 
Once per fortnight 0 
Once per week 2 
Not answered 1 
Using KS for a house Frequency 
Yes 19 
No 67 
Not answered 1 
 
     The contribution rate is related to the enrolment date of members.  In 2009 the default 
contribution rate dropped from 4 percent to 2 percent.  A total of 51 of respondents were 
enrolled in KiwiSaver before 2009, with a further 20 enrolling after 2009.  Enrolment 
figures for 2009 are not included because it could not be determined if people enrolling that 
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year joined KiwiSaver before or after the changes
3
.  For those enrolled before 2009, 60% are 
currently continuing to contribute at the default rate when they joined, which was 4 percent.  
For members enrolled after 2009, 55% are currently contributing the default rate of 2 
percent.  This provides further evidence that KiwiSaver members show little involvement 
towards the management of their funds, with the majority contributing at the default rate 
when they joined.  For the four respondents contributing 0%, two are on a contribution 
holiday, one is unemployed, and one gave no reason. 
 
Knowledge about KiwiSaver 
     This section of the survey assessed respondent’s knowledge of the KiwiSaver scheme 
and its benefits.  As Table 4.5 shows, overall the results indicate a lack of knowledge about 
the KiwiSaver scheme.  Members gave correct answers 13% to 78% of the time with a mean 
of 32.2%.  In comparison, non-members were correct 9% to 40% of the time with a mean of 
21.8%.  Non-members were also more likely to be unsure with a mean of 54.8% answering 
unsure on each question, compared with 43.4% for members. 
     A composite KiwiSaver knowledge score was calculated by marking the questions, one 
for correct and zero for incorrect.  The scores were summed to give an overall representation 
of how knowledgeable respondents were about KiwiSaver.  Scores could therefore fall in a 
range from zero to eight.  Non-members tended to have lower scores (M = 1.77, SD = 1.99) 
compared with members (M = 2.54, SD = 1.72).  While the KiwiSaver knowledge scores 
were very low for both groups they were still significantly higher for members t(132) = 
2.249, p < 0.05.  A Cronbach alpha of .67 showed the scale has good internal reliability. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The changes in minimum contribution rate came into effect on April 1, 2009. 
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Table 4.5 
Respondent’s Knowledge about KiwiSaver 
 Members Non-members 
Question Correct Incorrect Unsure Correct Incorrect Unsure 
Years until first 
  home withdrawal 
24.1% 47.2% 28.7% 12.8% 46.8% 40.4% 
Withdrawals for first 
  home purchase 
18.4% 25.3% 56.3% 8.5% 21.3% 70.2% 
Maximum first home 
  deposit subsidy 
17.4% 23.3% 59.3% 8.5% 31.9% 59.6% 
Months until 
 contribution holiday 
26.4% 21.9% 51.7% 25.5% 21.3% 53.2% 
Maximum length of 
 contribution holiday 
12.8% 31.4% 55.8% 14.9% 42.5% 57.4% 
Able to leave after 8 
  weeks 
36.8% 12.6% 50.5% 29.8% 4.3% 66.0% 
Contact to change 
  Scheme 
43.7% 24.2% 32.1% 34.0% 14.9% 51.1% 
Contact to check 
  KiwiSaver balance 
78.2% 9.2% 12.6% 40.4% 19.2% 40.4% 
 
 
     Table 4.6 displays the variables that correlate significantly with the intent to make a first 
home withdrawal.  Members that intended to make withdrawals from their KiwiSaver 
account to buy their first home were more likely to be young, possess few assets, have a 
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lower income, know less about investing in general, and be more risk averse.  Results of the 
questions asking about the benefits of KiwiSaver in making a first home purchase were 
compared between KiwiSaver members planning on withdrawing KiwiSaver savings to 
purchase a house, and those that were not planning to do so.  As Table 4.7 shows, there was 
little difference between members who were saving for a house purchase and those who 
were not. 
Table 4.6 
Summary of Bivariate Correlations with Intent to make a First Home Withdrawal 
Bivariate Correlation 
Age -.434** 
Other investments/saving plans -.403** 
Income -.378** 
General Investment Knowledge -.353** 
KSRP -.221* 
Note. Using KiwiSaver to purchase a house scored 1 = no and 2 = yes 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
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Table 4.7 
Comparison of Means on Knowledge of KiwiSaver Home Buying Benefits 
 For House Purchase Not for House Purchase 
Question Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N 
First home withdrawal 
     (years) 
3.31 1.01 16 3.93 1.41 45 
First home purchase 
     withdrawal score 
0.84 1.02 19 0.48 .73 66 
Max. deposit subsidy ($) 83,500.13 134,592.42 8 23,923.12 59,539.50 26 
Note. There were no significant differences 
     The maximum deposit subsidy question contained five outliers of $50,000 (1), $100,000 
(1) and $300,000 (3) which were significantly higher than the correct answer of $5,000.  To 
counter the possibility of input errors of too many zeros entered, the four highest outliers 
were first divided by ten.  However, this did not affect the significance of the means 
comparison.  Next, winsorisation was used to limit the five outliers to values of $30,000, but 
this did not change the statistical significance.  The next data transformation was to remove 
the outliers entirely.  This dropped the mean values to $3,600 (SD = $2,190) for members 
using KiwiSaver to purchase a house, and $9,250 (SD = $7,941) for those not using 
KiwiSaver for a house purchase.  The difference between these means was statistically 
significant, t(27) = -2.983, p < 0.01, but because of the low number of respondents that 
answered this question, and the high variation, it is quite possible that this was a false 
positive result. 
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Risk Attitudes 
     Table 4.8 summarises the statistics for the KiwiSaver Scheme Risk Profile (KSRP), 
Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale (ImpSS), and Investment Risk Attitude Scale (IRAS).  
Scores on these scales can range from four to twenty for the KiwiSaver Profile, zero to 
nineteen for Impulsive Sensation Seeking, and six to thirty for Investment Risk Attitude.  A 
higher score on these scales indicates a more risk tolerant attitude.  In addition to the 
KiwiSaver Risk Profile, respondents were asked if they had filled out a similar risk profile 
questionnaire before.  Although most KiwiSaver providers have some form this short 
questionnaire on their websites, or in investor statements, the vast majority of respondents 
(91%) indicated they had not completed one before.  Only 7% of members indicated they 
had completed a similar investor profile before, and 2% were unsure. 
Table 4.8 
Risk Scale Scores 
Scale Mean Std. Dev. 
KiwiSaver Risk Profile 
  Members 11.20 3.78 
  Non members 11.55 4.14 
Impulsive Sensation Seeking Scale 
  Members 5.45 3.79 
  Non-members 4.76 3.31 
Investment Risk Attitude Scale 
  Members 16.31 4.26 
  Non members 15.85 4.40 
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     There was no significant difference between the two groups on any of these risk scales. 
All scales had good internal reliability with Cronbach alphas of .75, .79, and .80 for the 
KiwiSaver Risk Profile, Impulsive Sensation Seeking, and Investment Risk Attitude scales 
respectively. 
 
Correlational Analyses 
     Respondents who were members of KiwiSaver were asked what best described the type 
of KiwiSaver investment fund they were in.  The different investment fund types were 
ranked on a 5 point scale, shown in Table 4.9, to allow its use in the following correlational 
and multiple regression analyses. 
Table 4.9 
Coding of KiwiSaver Investment Fund Types 
Investment Fund Type Coding 
Cash (low risk) 1 
Conservative (low to medium 
risk) 
2 
Balanced (medium risk) 3 
Growth (medium to high risk) 4 
Aggressive (high risk) 5 
 
Risk level 
     Correlations between the three risk scales are shown in Table 4.10.  When all respondents 
were pooled together, the scores for the KiwiSaver Risk Profile and the Investment Risk 
Attitude scale correlated very strongly r = .701, n = 134, p < .01.  The Impulsive Sensation 
Seeking scale correlated with the Investment Risk Attitude scale but not with the KiwiSaver 
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Risk Profile.  When broken down by KiwiSaver membership, the correlation between the 
Investment Risk Attitude scale and the Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale loses significance 
for non-members.  However, this is likely due to the smaller sample size of non-members.  
Despite this limitation the results show that the KiwiSaver Risk Profile has good convergent 
validity with the Investment Risk Attitude scale. 
Table 4.10 
Intercorrelations between the Three Risk Scales 
Scale ImpSS IRAS 
 All respondents (n = 134) 
KSRP .070 .701* 
ImpSS - .308* 
 Members (n = 87) 
KSRP .094 .666* 
ImpSS     - .316* 
 Non-members (n = 47) 
KSRP .031 .772* 
ImpSS     -          .285 
*p < 0.01 
     Table 4.11 shows the correlations between the risk scales and investment fund type of 
KiwiSaver members.  As a general measure of risk seeking, the Impulsive Sensation 
Seeking scale did not correlate with investment fund choice.  In comparison, the Investment 
Risk Attitude scale and the KiwiSaver Risk Profile were designed to assess risk tolerance in 
the context of financial investment, and were shown to be better correlated with investment 
choices.  Respondents who scored higher on these specific measures of risk tolerance were 
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more likely to invest in a KiwiSaver fund that invests a large proportion in riskier asset 
classes of property and shares. 
Table 4.11 
Correlations between Risk Scales and Investment Fund Type 
Bivariate Correlation 
KSRP .520* 
IRAS .450* 
ImpSS .184 
*p < 0.01 
     For the subset of members that chose a fund type because it matched their level of 
preferred risk, 94% chose to invest in conservative or balanced type funds.  Further analysis 
of this subset of members was compared with the rest of the KiwiSaver member population 
and is shown in Table 4.12.  This segment of the KiwiSaver member population scored 
significantly lower on the Investment Risk Attitude scale.  Therefore, there is moderate, but 
not strong, evidence that KiwiSaver members who choose their fund primarily based on 
their preferred level of risk are more likely to choose a more conservative fund.  However, 
the lack of a significant difference in scores on the KiwiSaver Risk Profile suggests other 
factors, like expected return, in addition to risk level can have an influence when choosing 
an investment fund. 
Table 4.12 
Comparison of Mean Average Risk Scale Scores 
Population segment KSRP IRAS ImpSS 
Matches risk level 10.28 13.78* 4.50 
Other reasons 11.43 16.97* 5.70 
*Significant mean average difference, p < 0.01 
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Demographic variables 
     Table 4.13 shows age, education level, income, and gender, are correlated to some degree 
with risk level, knowledge of investment, and the number of other investments and saving 
plans held among members of KiwiSaver.  KiwiSaver members who were older, male, more 
highly educated, and earned a higher income tended to be more risk tolerant, more 
knowledgeable of investment in general, and were more likely to have other investments and 
saving plans in addition to KiwiSaver. 
Table 4.13 
Significant Correlations with Demographic Variables 
Demographic 
variable 
KSRP IRAS Investment 
knowledge 
Other investments 
held 
Age  .292**   .370** .486** 
Education level  .266*   .218*   
Income  .416**   .296**   .461** .470** 
Gender 
a 
-.289** -.276* -.317**  
a 
Scored 1 = male, and 2 = female 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
     The only correlation between investment fund and a demographic variable was for 
gender, with females being more risk averse than males in their choice of KiwiSaver 
investment fund, r = -.319, n = 87, p < .01. 
Knowledge of investment 
     Scores on the general investment knowledge scale were positively correlated with the 
number of other investments held, r = .508, n, p < .01, which shows higher knowledge of 
investment is associated with higher levels of investment and diversification.  However, 
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there was no significant correlation between general investment knowledge and knowledge 
of the KiwiSaver scheme.  Despite this, Table 4.14 shows both measures of knowledge are 
correlated with risk attitude, with greater knowledge associated with a more risk tolerant 
attitude. 
Table 4.14 
Correlations between Knowledge Scales and Risk Scales 
 KSRP IRAS 
General investment knowledge .518** .400* 
Knowledge of KiwiSaver .212* .227* 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
     Knowledge about KiwiSaver was significantly correlated with choice of KiwiSaver 
investment fund, r = .275, n = 87, p < .05.  Additionally knowledge about KiwiSaver was 
correlated with frequency spent checking KiwiSaver account balance, r = .287, n = 87, p < 
.01, and with the year enrolled in the scheme, r = -.282, n = 87, p < .01.  Therefore, a higher 
knowledge about KiwiSaver was associated with members who joined KiwiSaver earlier, 
and who checked their account balance more frequently.  Additionally, frequency spent 
checking KiwiSaver account balance was correlated with the year enrolled, r = -.337 n = 87 
p<.01. 
 
Regression Analyses 
     A summary of significant correlations with KiwiSaver investment fund type are shown in 
Table 4.15.  To analyse their predictive validity, the dependent variable of investment fund 
type was regressed onto these variables with the results shown in Table 4.16 as model 1. 
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Table 4.15 
Summary of Bivariate Correlations with KiwiSaver Investment Fund 
Bivariate  Correlation 
Gender -.319** 
KS knowledge score .275* 
KSRP .520** 
IRAS .450** 
Note. Gender is scored 1 = male and 2 = female 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
     The high correlation between the KiwiSaver Risk Profile and the Investor Risk Attitude 
Scale (r = .701) does raise a problem of multicollinearity in this analysis.  Because 
Investment Risk Attitude scale correlated lower (r = .450) with investment fund type than 
the KiwiSaver Risk Profile (r = .520) it was removed from the regression analysis.  The 
results of the simultaneous multiple regression analysis, without investment risk attitude as 
an independent variable, is shown in Table 4.16 as model 2. 
     The multiple regression analysis shows the best predictor of type of KiwiSaver 
investment fund was an individual’s score on the KiwiSaver Risk Profile.  A higher score on 
this scale can predict investment in a riskier KiwiSaver investment fund which invests a 
higher proportion in the investment asset classes of property and shares.  This is not 
surprising because scores on these types of risk profile questionnaires in KiwiSaver 
investment statements are often used to make a recommendation of which type of fund to 
invest in.
4
  However, few respondents (9%) indicated they had completed a similar profile 
before.  Therefore, although few KiwiSaver members take these kinds of short 
                                                 
4 Scheme providers do provide a disclaimer stating that these risk profiles are guides only and do not constitute 
personal or professional financial advice. 
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questionnaires offered by scheme providers, the evidence does suggest that they are 
effective in assessing an investor’s risk attitude towards investment in KiwiSaver and can 
predict what type of investment fund they are likely to invest in. 
Table 4.16 
Simultaneous Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting KiwiSaver Investment Fund Type 
 B SE B β 
   Model 1    
KSRP   .106 .044  .347* 
Gender  -.380 .227 -.175 
KS knowledge   .100 .066  .157 
IRAS   .028 .036  .112 
Constant 1.307* .638  
   Model 2    
KSRP   .129 .032  .422** 
Gender  -.390 .210 -.190 
KS Knowledge   .106 .064  .166 
Constant 1.493** .568  
Note. R
2
 = .329** for model 1; R
2
 = .327** for model 2 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
     The multiple regression analysis was expanded to include age, education level, and 
income, which were variables that correlated with the KiwiSaver Risk Profile shown in 
Tables 4.13 and 4.14.  A simultaneous multiple regression analysis, shown in Table 4.17, 
revealed that in addition to scores on the KiwiSaver Risk Profile, age is reported to be a 
significant predictor of investment fund type.  
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Table 4.17 
Simultaneous Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Type of KiwiSaver Investment Fund 
Variable B SE B β 
KSRP   .133 .035  .445** 
Age  -.229 .077 -.333** 
Income   .154 .099  .218 
Gender  -.455 .236 -.213 
General Investment Knowledge  -.193 .115 -.205 
Knowledge of KiwiSaver   .116 .068  .180 
Education   .010 .102  .011 
Constant 2.481** .832  
Note. R
2
 = .425** 
**p < .01 
     These results show a more risk tolerant attitude, and younger age, were the best 
predictors of investment in riskier growth type investment funds.  A younger age predicting 
investment in riskier growth type funds was in contrast to the positive correlation reported 
between age and tolerant risk attitude measured by the KiwiSaver Risk Profile.  This shows 
that older people may have a more risk tolerant attitude, but their investment behavior is 
more conservative. 
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CHAPTER 5:  DISCUSSION 
 
     What factors influence the choice of KiwiSaver investment funds is a question that has 
not been studied before.  A review of the literature suggest that demographics, risk attitudes, 
levels of financial knowledge, default rules, recommendations from friends and family, 
professional financial advice, previous performance, fees, the reputable brand effect of 
banks, and advertising may all have various levels of influence on fund choice.  The results 
regarding the main reason for fund choice will be discussed regarding their relative 
frequency with which they are given.  Next, the impact of default rules on fund choice, and 
the pattern of conservative investment are discussed.  After this, the role of risk attitudes, 
knowledge of the KiwiSaver scheme, and investment in general, and demographic factors 
are discussed.  This is followed by a discussion on the characteristics of members planning 
on using their KiwiSaver savings to purchase a house, and the difficulties faced in using this 
beneficial feature.  Finally, implications for providers and the government are considered, 
followed by a review of the general limitations of the study and recommendations for future 
research. 
 
Reasons behind Fund Choice 
     The main reasons given by respondents for why they are invested in their current 
KiwiSaver fund show some variation, yet four themes emerge from the pattern of results.  
First, about one-third of respondents indicated their fund was chosen for them by either their 
employer or Inland Revenue.  This may exhibit either an apathetic attitude towards 
management of their KiwiSaver account, a desire to join KiwiSaver primarily for the 
financial benefits of the $1,000 kickstart and matching contributions, or they recognise their 
lack of investment expertise, but have not sought professional advice.  Second, a fifth of 
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respondents choose their fund because it best matches their level of risk.  Third, 15% cite 
recommendations from family or friends for their choice of KiwiSaver fund compared with 
5% citing advice from financial advisors.  This highlights the preference of personal over 
professional advice sought in financial matters, a pattern that has been reported before in the 
literature (Harrison, Waite, & White, 2006; Murray, 1991; Shiller & Pound, 1989).  Finally, 
concrete aspects of the fund and provider, including performance and fees, the bank as a 
provider, and marketing are, with the exception of the provider being a main bank, 
infrequently reported as the main reason for investment fund choice. 
     It is important to note that these reasons are not mutually exclusive.  Different KiwiSaver 
funds could be recommended by friends because of their good performance, but it may be 
the evaluation of an individual’s own investment risk tolerance that may be the main 
contributing factor when selecting a fund.  Despite this limitation, the main reasons for 
investing in a specific KiwiSaver fund can be traced back to either low management 
involvement, risk level, source of advice, or aspects of the fund. 
 
Default Rules 
     The results show a high number of KiwiSaver members are invested in a default fund 
with either their employers preferred scheme or one of the six government-appointed default 
funds.  This has produced a tendency in the population to invest in conservative type funds, 
or balanced type funds in the case of some employer default schemes.  These funds invest a 
significant proportion into conservative income assets.  Furthermore, many members of 
KiwiSaver are contributing at the minimum rate when they enrolled in the scheme. 
     This strong effect of default rules on participation, fund choice, and contribution rate, 
corroborate the research on the effect of default rules in other pension schemes overseas 
(Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2009; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 2002; 
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Cronqvist & Thaler, 2004; Inland Revenue, 2012a; Madrian & Shea, 2001).  However, 
comparison between pension schemes overseas and KiwiSaver is limited by the fact that 
automatic enrolment has been a feature of KiwiSaver from the beginning.  This prevents a 
before and after comparison of the effects of automatic enrolment.  Another limiting factor 
in making a comparison is that data on enrolment trends for KiwiSaver cannot currently be 
analysed at a company level, only at a national level.  At the company level, participation 
rates of new employees are analysed.  However, at the national level of KiwiSaver, 
participation rates of the entire eligible workforce are analysed.  Because the KiwiSaver 
scheme is relatively new, having been operational for a little over five years, existing 
employees have been opting in at a higher rate in the first few years (Inland Revenue, 
2012a).  This has skewed the results to showing a higher ratio of opt in enrolments to 
automatic enrolments. 
     Despite these limitations on studying the effect of automatic enrolment on participation 
rates, there is still strong evidence that for individuals who are automatically enrolled, the 
default rules have a significant effect on fund choice and contribution rate.  This study 
reported that nearly one third of KiwiSaver members are invested in a fund that was chosen 
for them because it was either, their employer’s default fund, or it was allocated to them by 
Inland Revenue.  About half of the members invested in a default fund were allocated into a 
conservative type fund by either their employer, or Inland Revenue, and remain there.  The 
other half were defaulted into balanced and growth type funds by their employer, or were 
unsure of the type of fund they are invested in. 
     A major difference between these findings and the literature on default rules in 401(k) 
plans is that about half of the employer nominated default funds in this study are not 
conservative type funds.  In a review of the effects of automatic enrolment in 401(k) plans 
Choi et al. (2002) reported most employers that automatically enrol new employees, choose 
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very conservative type funds as the nominated default.  This is encouraging because it shows 
a willingness by employers in New Zealand to nominate a fund for their employees that may 
be more likely to produce higher returns and promote retirement saving goals.  However, 
riskier employer nominated default funds may not be suitable for all new employees, 
especially older employees that may be more suited to investing in a conservative fund. 
     Another effect of the default rules is that many KiwiSaver members are still contributing 
at the minimum default rate when they joined.  In April 2009, the minimum contribution rate 
was dropped from 4 percent to 2 percent.  A comparison of contribution rates for members 
shows that 39% of members enrolled before 2009 are contributing at the previous minimum 
rate of 4 percent.  Meanwhile, 55% of members enrolled after 2009 are contributing at the 
new minimum rate of 2 percent.  Madrian and Shea (2001) reported that, before automatic 
enrolment, participants in a 401(k) plan were most likely to contribute at a rate of 6%.  
When automatic enrolment was introduced, the default rate selected was 3%, and 76% of 
new employees automatically enrolled contributed at this rate. 
     Madrian and Shea (2001) explain this effect of default rates as a result of inertia among 
participants in 401(k) plans, resulting in participants becoming passive savers.  They 
reported six out of ten employees did nothing to change their contribution rate, or asset 
allocation after being automatically enrolled.  This pattern also held for existing employees 
who chose to opt into the 401(k) plan after automatic enrolment was implemented. 
     Inertia is evident in this study where 84% of respondents indicated they had not changed 
their investment fund.  However, the proportion of KiwiSaver members contributing at the 
minimum default rate when they enrolled is lower than what Madrian and Shea (2001) 
reported.  This shows that inertia in KiwiSaver is stronger for choice of investment fund, but 
not for contribution rate.  Inertia could be due to the complexity of the decision making 
process, a lack of adequate information, or the implicit assumption that there is an 
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endorsement effect where default options constitute investment advice (Beshears et al., 
2009; Madrian & Shea, 2001; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). 
 
Tendency towards Conservative Investment 
     Both Beshears et al. (2009) and Madrian and Shea (2001) favour the endorsement effect 
because it explains why they report employees who opt into 401(k) plans, after automatic 
enrolment is established, are just as likely to invest in the default investment fund as 
automatically enrolled participants are, but not at the default contribution rate.  This would 
reflect the uncertainty participants who choose to opt in have about asset allocation, but not 
about contribution rate which is a far less complex decision. 
     In their review on the power of default rules, Beshears et al. (2009) reported employees 
who chose to move away from the default options, still tended allocate a significantly higher 
amount in the default fund compared with participants who had not been automatically 
enrolled.  Although it is uncommon for KiwiSaver members to spread their allocations 
among various funds offered by a provider, the high investment rates in conservative and 
balanced funds show that while some KiwiSaver members do move out of the default funds, 
they often reinvest in something similar.  Of the 68% of KiwiSaver members not invested in 
a default fund, 42% are in a cash or conservative type fund, and 29% are in balanced type 
funds which still invest a significant proportion in conservative assets. 
     This tendency towards conservative investment is strongest among respondents who 
choose their fund based on their risk level, with 94% choosing a low risk conservative or 
balanced type fund.  Other popular reasons for choosing a KiwiSaver fund included 
recommendations from friends and family, and that the fund provider was a main bank.  
Respondents citing these reasons also invested conservatively, with 58% investing in 
conservative or balanced type funds. 
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     This large proportion of respondents investing in conservative funds has implications for 
schemes providers and the government.  Some providers and commentators have argued that 
to overcome this conservative tendency, automatically enrolled members should be placed 
into a ‘life stages fund’ which would adjust an investor’s allocation to income and growth 
assets based on their age and time to retirement (Gibson, 2013; Mace, 2012a).  This would 
place young members into a growth type fund, and progressively move them into a more 
conservative asset allocation as they near retirement. 
     Setting the life stages option as a default scheme has received both endorsement and 
criticism.  Similar defined contribution pension systems with an age based default allocation 
strategy already exist in Chile, Mexico, Peru, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and the Slovak 
Republic (Iglesias, 2011).  Mercer, OnePath, and Tower, who are three of the six default 
scheme providers, support the life stages option, along with provider ANZ and the Financial 
Markets Authority.  Two other default providers, AMP and ASB along with major providers 
Kiwibank and Westpac, and the Commission for Financial Literacy and Retirement Income, 
oppose the life stages option.  Research conducted by ANZ has been reported to show that a 
25 year-old investor could be $72,000 worse off if invested in a conservative fund compared 
with investing in the life stages option (Mace, 2012a). 
     However, Retirement Commissioner Diane Crossan and provider Westpac Bank argue 
that a life stages approach may not suit the investment goals of everyone (Mace, 2012b).  
For example, some investors may be distrusting of the share market and its potential for 
negative investment returns after the recent economic recession.  Iglesias (2011) also argues 
that an individual’s risk preferences are not solely determined by age.  Differences in 
employment histories, job certainty, and levels of wealth can vary between individuals 
within the same age-based cohort. Additionally, provider ASB argue that there appears to be 
a tendency of people wanting to invest in conservative funds citing 60% of people in its 
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conservative default fund have decided to remain there (Gibson, 2013).  A KiwiSaver survey 
conducted by ASB reported investment in conservative funds is increasing, which supports 
evidence from the Financial Markets authority which reported that in the year ending March 
2012, a net $41 million was shifted out of ‘share-heavy’ growth funds, and a net $36 million 
was shifted into conservative funds (Gibson, 2012a). 
 
Risk Attitudes 
     This study reported the risk scales used by KiwiSaver providers can be significant 
predictors of an individual’s attitude towards financial risk.  The KiwiSaver Risk Profile is 
used by three KiwiSaver scheme providers; ANZ, National Bank, and OnePath.  Combined, 
these providers have the largest number of KiwiSaver members and funds under 
management (Morningstar, 2012).  Its inclusion in the survey with the Investment Risk 
Attitude scale and the Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale allowed an analysis of its 
convergent validity, and to compare its predictive validity with the other risk scales.  The 
KiwiSaver Risk Profile has good convergent validity with the Investment Risk Attitude 
scale, but not with the Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale.  In contrast, the Investment Risk 
Attitude scale does correlate with the Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale, but not as strongly 
as it correlates with the KiwiSaver Risk Profile.  This suggests that the perceived risk of 
investing in KiwiSaver is context specific, and risk attitudes towards KiwiSaver investment 
are best measured by specific investment risk attitude scales, instead of more general risk 
attitude scales, like the Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale. 
     Another related finding is that the KiwiSaver Risk Profile is correlated with investment 
fund type better than the Investment Risk Attitude scale, and is the best predictor of 
investment fund type.  A higher score on the KiwiSaver Risk Profile indicates a higher 
likelihood of investment in riskier growth type investment funds.  This provides further 
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evidence that the more specific the risk scale to the situation, the better it is at predicting 
risky behavior in that situation.  The predictive validity of the KiwiSaver Risk Profile also 
establishes for the first time in the literature a causal link between a valid measure of risk 
attitude and investor behavior in KiwiSaver. 
     However, there is the possibility that the direction of this causal link could go in the 
opposite direction.  The investment in a riskier growth fund could result in more risk 
tolerance.   For example, Warneryd (2001) reported higher levels of interest in financial 
matters can predict higher levels of risk tolerance.  This would lead to investment in riskier 
investment funds.  This study did find more knowledge of the KiwiSaver scheme is related 
to higher risk tolerance, and investment in risky growth type funds.  However, the results of 
the multiple regression analyses showed risk attitude, and not level of knowledge, was a 
stronger predictor of investment fund choice. 
     Finally, investment risk attitude was shown to be associated with age, education level, 
income, and gender.  Higher risk tolerance was observed among respondents who were 
older, had a higher level of education, earned more, and male.  These findings support and 
extend the literature on demographic variables associated with risk attitudes.  However, 
there are some differences between this study and the literature.  For example, in this study 
employment status was not associated with risk attitude, but age was associated, which is in 
contrast with the evidence from the literature (Anbar & Eker, 2010; Grable & Lytton, 1998).  
However, although age was reported to be positively correlated with risk tolerance, the 
multiple regression analysis reported older people are more likely to invest in conservative 
type funds.  Therefore, increased age is positively associated with an increase in risky 
attitude, but a decrease in risky behavior. 
 
 
93 
 
Investment Knowledge 
     Four significant findings emerged from the analysis of knowledge of KiwiSaver and 
investing in general.  First, the relationship between investment knowledge and risk attitudes 
showed knowledge of investing, and KiwiSaver, increased as individuals become less risk 
averse.  This supports the findings by Warneryd (2001) who studied the determinants of risk 
aversion across three surveys in the Netherlands and Sweden.  Warneryd (2001) reported 
risk aversion only varied consistently with psychological variables, including a relationship 
with interest in financial matters.  As interest in financial matters increased, risk aversion 
decreased. 
     Secondly, members who enrolled earlier are more knowledgeable about the KiwiSaver 
scheme.  This may reflect a specific condition where choosing to join the KiwiSaver scheme 
while it was new may have resulted from information researched or advertised about the 
benefits of joining KiwiSaver, resulting in higher levels of knowledge about the scheme.  
Knowledge of KiwiSaver and the year enrolled in the scheme are also associated with the 
frequency with which individuals check their KiwiSaver account balance, providing 
additional evidence that members who enrolled earlier are more involved and interested 
about their retirement savings invested in KiwiSaver.  In contrast, later enrolees may be 
more likely to have been automatically enrolled, and more likely to follow the default rules.  
Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) reported that in the absence of marketing efforts, the power of 
default rules increase, and Harrison et al. (2006) reported that information search behavior 
of individuals joining a pension scheme tended to be passive, with most people joining 
relatively uninformed.  Future research could see if the correlation between KiwiSaver 
knowledge and the year of enrolment would weaken as the proportion of members enrolling 
uninformed increases. 
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     Thirdly, respondents who are older, earn a higher income, and are male, tend to be more 
knowledgeable about investing.  It is expected that planning and saving for retirement 
should require some knowledge of investing savings.  These findings are consistent with the 
literature which shows that retirement planning is greater with age (Baker & Haslem, 1974; 
Petkoska & Earl, 2009), men (Bajtelsmit, Bernasek, & Jianakoplos, 1999; Jacobs-Lawson, 
Hershey, & Neukam, 2004), and higher income earners (Jacobs-Lawson et al., 2004).  
However, knowledge of KiwiSaver does not correlate with any demographic variables at all.  
A possible explanation is that mean scores on the KiwiSaver knowledge section of the 
survey were so low it created a floor effect, and masked any possible differences in 
demographic variables.  This is consistent with previous findings that mutual fund investors 
are largely uninformed about their investments (Capon, Fitzsimons, & Prince, 1996). 
     Finally, better knowledge of the KiwiSaver scheme was reported to be related to 
investment in riskier growth type funds.  Financial education on retirement saving has been 
shown to increase participation and contributions to pension plans (Bayer, Bernheim, & 
Scholz, 2009).  However, IQ may also be an important predictor of knowledge about the 
KiwiSaver scheme (Grinblatt, Keloharju, & Linnainmaa, 2011).  New KiwiSaver members, 
particularly young members, may also be nudged by financial advisors towards investment 
in a growth type fund (Zhang, 2013).  However, better knowledge of KiwiSaver may be the 
result of intelligent individuals seeking out information about the scheme by themselves.  
Therefore, a topic for future research would be to study the comparative effects that 
education and general intelligence may have on knowledge about KiwiSaver and the effect 
this has on investment behavior and attitudes. 
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Demographics 
     Despite the fact that gender, education, income, and age, were predicted to be associated 
with KiwiSaver investment fund choice, only gender showed a significant correlation with 
fund choice.  Males are more likely to invest in riskier growth funds.  However, the multiple 
regression analysis showed that age is the only significant demographic variable that 
predicts fund type, with younger KiwiSaver members invested in riskier investment funds.  
Warneryd (2001) states that, compared with research on market inefficiencies, there has 
been very little research analysing the demographic and psychological characteristics of 
investors. 
     In one of the few studies comparing demographic variables and investor behavior in 
401(k) plans using aggregate data, Copeland (2004) reported that higher investment in 
equities was associated with individuals that were highly educated, earned a higher income, 
and were younger.  However, there can be extreme variations around the mean values which 
can make the mean differences an artefact of the analysis and not representative of a 
majority of individuals (Copeland, 2011; VanDerhi, Holden, Alonso, & Bass, 2011). 
     An advantage of the KiwiSaver scheme is that members do not have to make asset 
allocations themselves.  For example, KiwiSaver members do not have to make investment 
asset allocations towards equity funds based on their perceived risk, unlike 401(k) and IRA 
participants in the United States.  This more passive approach towards KiwiSaver funds may 
be suppressing the expected effects of demographic variables, which could be the result of 
consideration of making asset allocations. 
     Despite this limitation, the relationship between gender and age on KiwiSaver investment 
fund type shows that demographic factors still have an influence.  Further research could 
include a hypothetical asset allocation scenario.  Participants would allocate a percentage of 
a hypothetical KiwiSaver mutual fund, to shares, property, fixed interest, and term deposits.  
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The effect of demographic variables could then become significant due to this more active 
asset allocation management style. 
 
House Purchase Benefits of KiwiSaver 
     One of the popular benefits of the KiwiSaver scheme is the ability to withdraw 
contributions after three years to use in purchasing a house for first home buyers.  Although 
the initial uptake of the first home withdrawal feature was higher than forecast, many 
members have experienced confusion over the process of the withdrawal (Inland Revenue, 
2011).  Despite this confusion, about one-fifth of respondents indicate they are planning on 
using the first home withdrawal feature of KiwiSaver.  These respondents are more likely to 
enrol earlier in KiwiSaver, be more risk averse, less knowledgeable about investing, 
younger, earn a lower income, and have fewer other investments and saving plans. 
     This subset of respondents did not score significantly better than the rest of the 
KiwiSaver member population on the KiwiSaver knowledge questions about the home 
purchase benefits of KiwiSaver.  This non-significant difference may arise from the 
confusion surrounding the first-home withdrawal and first-home deposit subsidy, resulting 
in all members being equally unknowledgeable about the benefits.  A lack of awareness 
about the process and requirements, and difficulty in coordinating the applications between 
scheme providers, Housing New Zealand, Inland Revenue, banks, lawyers and real estate 
agents, have been cited as obstacles towards benefiting from these features (Gibson, 2012b).  
In some cases this confusion has left members missing out on these benefits. 
 
Implications 
     The findings of this study suggest that KiwiSaver members may be unconcerned or 
apathetic about their KiwiSaver funds, have low levels of investment risk tolerance, and low 
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knowledge of their investments.  This has resulted in a large number of KiwiSaver members 
remaining in the funds they were defaulted into when they were automatically enrolled.  
Even for members that choose their own fund, there is a tendency towards more 
conservative investments.  This conservative tendency could result in a significant number 
of individuals, who rely solely on KiwiSaver to fund their retirement, not saving an adequate 
amount for their retirement.  Alternatively it could result in protection from potentially 
significant falls in savings that are invested in riskier growth type funds. 
     One option to counter the conservative investment tendency is to change the default rules 
so individuals are placed into a different types of fund based on their age and investment 
time horizon.  For example, young people entering the workforce in their twenties would be 
defaulted into an aggressive fund that invests mainly in shares.  In contrast, people nearing 
retirement who enter KiwiSaver would be defaulted into a more conservative fund investing 
in income assets like bonds and term deposits.  However, Beshears et al. (2009) argue that 
an optimal default depends on a large degree of homogeneity among individual preferences 
and therefore there is no single optimal set of default rules.  With factors other than age 
affecting individual preferences, this life stages option as a default may not necessarily be 
the best option. 
     While this approach has its proponents and critics, it is only one method of choice 
architecture for influencing choices.  The goal of a choice architect is to indirectly influence 
the choices of other people (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009).  Using defaults to make a no-choice 
option easiest is one way of influencing choice but there are other options that could be 
applied to KiwiSaver.  Another method is to provide feedback where well designed systems 
inform people of their fund’s performance, either good or bad.  Feedback in a KiwiSaver 
context does occur where annual investor statements are sent by scheme providers to their 
members detailing their contributions and return on investment of their account balance each 
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year.  This could be used to highlight the difference between the performances of 
conservative default funds and better performing growth funds, and to make a 
recommendation to default fund members to change their fund.  However, this approach 
could be counter-productive, because annual returns are not necessarily an indication of 
future performance and some members in default funds, like older people, may not benefit 
from changing to a riskier investment fund. 
     The alternative to redesigning the KiwiSaver scheme is to invest in financial education.  
An example of this is the Sorted website, https://www.sorted.org.nz/, an independent 
website run by the Commission for Financial Literacy and Retirement Income, which offers 
free advice on managing finances and planning for retirement.  Part of its services include 
the use of financial calculators to estimate the amount of KiwiSaver savings an individual 
might contribute based on their age, income, and contribution rate. 
     The disadvantage of this service is that it requires KiwiSaver members to be attracted 
towards using the site.  The alternative is to actively promote financial education by having 
scheme providers and the government reaching out to KiwiSaver members.  However, 
Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) showed, the effect of advertising campaigns have only a 
temporary effect.  Additionally, financial education may not be sufficient to change 
investment behavior (Choi et al., 2002; Clark, d'Ambrosio, McDermed, & Sawant, 2006), 
and IQ may be a more important factor (Grinblatt et al., 2011). 
     What these options have in common is the goal of changing KiwiSaver investor behavior.  
Yet the methods used to achieve this goal differ significantly.  If KiwiSaver investment 
behavior is to be changed then a decision needs to be made between redesigning the 
KiwiSaver scheme, or to educate members about their investments.  Financial education 
places the onus on individual KiwiSaver members to change their investment fund to 
something more appropriate for themselves.  Alternatively, redesigning the default rules 
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relies less on active change by members and adopts a paternal libertarianism approach by 
influencing their options indirectly. 
 
Limitations of the Research 
     A limitation with the design of the survey used was the type of response formats used in 
the knowledge about KiwiSaver section.  Half of the questions were open questions, and the 
other half had a multiple choice format.  There could have been a difference between the 
two response types, with the open questions being a recall task.  The multiple choice 
questions, by virtue of having the correct answer given as one of the options, could represent 
a recognition task.  Non-response rates for the open choice questions ranged from 28% to 
60%, whereas ‘unsure’ responses for the multiple choice questions ranged from 11% to 49% 
of responses.  Whether respondents really did know less about KiwiSaver features assessed 
by the open questions, or if there was a recognition effect is unclear but could be a topic for 
further study. 
     An additional limitation with the KiwiSaver knowledge section was that questions 
focussed on the features of KiwiSaver.  They did not assess respondent’s knowledge about 
the process of how their contributions are invested, and their knowledge of the specific and 
general risks involved in making such an investment.  Assessment of this knowledge might 
have shown better convergent validity with the questions assessing general investment 
knowledge about the four investment asset classes of term deposits, fixed interest, property, 
and shares. 
     Another limitation is the nature of this study which used survey methods to assess 
investor behavior.  While the survey attempted to gather concrete factual data there was the 
possibility of a response bias when the risk scales were answered.  A link was reported 
between conservative investment and high risk aversion.  However, respondents may have 
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been primed by their answers to their investment fund type question.  In other words, 
respondents who indicated they were in a conservative fund may have assumed they were 
financially risk averse, and were therefore biased in their responses to the risk attitude 
scales. 
     Another method that can be used to assess risk aversion would be to conduct an 
experiment where participants would perform an asset allocation experiment.  Participants 
would first be asked to make optimal allocations of a hypothetical KiwiSaver fund to 
various investment asset classes that vary in their risk of investment.  This could then later 
be compared with their current KiwiSaver investment fund type to see if there is a difference 
between their recommendations and actual choice.  Warneryd (2001) reported investment 
behavior in an experimental setting can differ depending on whether a team’s own money, 
or money from another team, was invested.  Teams investing their own money showed more 
risk-averse behavior than when money from another team was invested. 
     Finally, the focus of this study was to assess what factors predicted the choice of a 
particular investment fund.  It did not look at assessing why a particular fund, or set of 
funds, was not invested in.  Aversion from a particular fund may explain some of the 
investor behavior seen in this study.  For example, respondents were given the option of 
citing good performance of a fund as the main reason for choosing to invest in that particular 
fund.  However, it may be equally applicable that bad performance may drive investors out 
of a fund (Del Guercio & Tkac, 2002).  While leaving poorly performing funds is not as 
common as joining funds with good performance, it is more common in pension mutual 
funds than non-pension mutual funds (Del Guercio & Tkac, 2002).  This may be due to the 
greater possibility of losing a significant amount of retirement savings in a pension mutual 
fund compared with a non-pension mutual fund. 
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     This aversive investment behavior could also be studied with respect to choice of scheme 
provider and contribution rate.  For example, members may contribute the minimum amount 
because they cannot afford to contribute at the higher rates.  With the minimum contribution 
rate scheduled to rise from 2% to 3% in April 2013, some commentators have suggested that 
this could lead to more low income earners taking a contributions holiday because they 
cannot afford the increase in contribution rate (Small, 2013).  In this case, investor behavior 
would be driven, not by an attraction to the contributions holiday, but by the aversion of 
having to contribute at a higher rate. 
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
 
     This study analysed the investment behavior and attitudes of members in KiwiSaver.  
KiwiSaver is a departure from previous nation-wide pay-as-you-go public pensions funded 
through taxation.  KiwiSaver is a voluntary save-as-you-go defined contribution scheme, 
and it contains financial incentives, including matching contributions from employers and a 
$1,000 kickstart from the government.  Once enrolled in KiwiSaver, automatic deductions 
from an employee’s gross salary or wage are placed into an investment fund offered by a 
government approved scheme provider.  Withdrawals can only be made upon reaching the 
retirement age, currently set at 65, or to purchase a first home. 
     There are several important reasons for evaluating the choice of investment fund by 
KiwiSaver members.  First, there are the changing demographics of New Zealand’s 
population.  Retirees are expected to become a larger proportion of the population, along 
with a corresponding relative decrease in the working population that is expected to provide 
the public pension through taxation.  Furthermore, this ageing demographic shift is expected 
to remain permanent.  Secondly, a large number of KiwiSaver members have not made a 
deliberate choice of investment fund and are currently invested in a conservative fund 
offered by a default scheme provider.  Thirdly, a tendency towards investment in 
conservative funds may mean that some members may not save enough for their retirement.  
Younger people in particular could benefit from a long term investment in a riskier growth 
fund.  Finally, previous research that examined KiwiSaver often focused on demographic 
factors behind participation and scheme provider membership.  There has been no previous 
research that has examined the factors behind the investment fund choice of KiwiSaver 
members. 
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     Research on saving acts and saving motives often highlight the life-cycle motive as a 
common reason for saving.  The life-cycle motive for saving is to provide for the anticipated 
future relationship between income and needs.  Modern portfolio theory can make 
recommendations for what may be the optimal way to save according to the life-cycle 
motive.  Because of the long investment time horizon, it may be financially beneficial to 
invest in riskier stocks because of their expected superior returns.  The long investment time 
horizon also allows for recovery from a short term drop in the value of an investment 
portfolio.  However, this recommendation is contingent on returns from human capital, the 
present value of future labour, remaining more positively correlated with ‘bond’ returns than 
with stock returns. 
     Saving can also be predicted by the Theory of Planned Behavior which suggests that 
three factors of, attitudes, social norms, and perceived behavioral control, influence 
intentions, which then influences behavior.  This theory predicts that investor saving 
behavior in KiwiSaver could be predicted using personal and interpersonal psychological 
variables.  Studies on decisions to buy into pension plan schemes have produced models 
showing that saving behavior may be influenced by significant changes in a person’s life, 
and awareness about the consequences of not saving for retirement.  However, a lack of 
access to reliable and useful information and uncertainty surrounding the process could be 
hindering factors towards saving. 
     Several variables were reviewed which could have an effect on KiwiSaver investment 
behavior.  Variables that could influence KiwiSaver investment fund choice to varying 
degrees included: demographic variables, specifically age, gender, education, and income, 
risk attitudes, financial knowledge, default rules, personal advice from friends and family, 
professional financial advice, the fees and past performance of investment funds, banks, and 
advertising. 
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     A survey was distributed among 134 people, with 87 members of KiwiSaver and 47 non-
members responding.  In addition to asking KiwiSaver members about their investment 
behavior, the survey asked all respondents about their behavior, knowledge, and attitudes 
towards investments in general.  Knowledge of the KiwiSaver scheme, measures of risk 
attitudes and questions on demographic characteristics were also investigated. 
     The results showed a tendency to invest in conservative type funds and balanced type 
funds which still invest a significant portion in conservative income assets.  Part of this 
conservative tendency is due to the default rules of the KiwiSaver scheme, with a third of 
respondents indicating they were invested in their current KiwiSaver fund because they had 
been placed there by default.  For members choosing a fund because it best matched their 
risk level, two thirds chose a conservative type fund and the remaining third were invested in 
a balanced type fund.  Other common reasons for a member’s choice of investment fund 
included, recommended by family and friends, and because the scheme provider was a main 
bank.  For both reasons, conservative or balanced investment was popular. 
     Correlations with investment fund type showed that members who were male, were more 
knowledgeable about KiwiSaver, and had a more risk tolerant attitude, were more likely to 
invest in a riskier growth type fund.  Multiple regression analysis showed that risk attitude, 
measured by the KiwiSaver Risk Profile, was the best predictor of investment fund choice.  
Higher scores on the KiwiSaver Risk Profile indicate a more risk tolerant attitude, and 
therefore a higher likelihood of investment in riskier investment funds.  Other variables 
correlated with this risk attitude measure were added to the multiple regression analysis.  
Only age was reported to also be a predictor of investment fund choice, with younger people 
more likely to invest in growth funds. 
     The study shows that KiwiSaver members invest conservatively for a variety of reasons.  
Many members have shown a low level of involvement in managing their KiwiSaver 
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investment, resulting in a significant proportion of KiwiSaver members remaining in the 
conservative default fund they were allocated to.  Whether this is due to apathy, or a 
deliberate buy and hold strategy to earn the benefits of matching contributions only, or a 
recognised lack of expertise in investing, is unclear.  Even when KiwiSaver members 
actively choose their fund based on their risk attitudes, or personal advice from others they 
tend to invest conservatively. 
     The study has some methodological limitations, including the format and scope of the 
questions asked.  Another limitation is the scope of the study where the focus was on what 
factors influenced the choice of a specific fund.  It did not examine reasons for avoiding 
certain funds or providers.  Research into these reasons may be useful in distinguishing 
members who are more risk averse among those invested in conservative funds. 
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APPENDIX A 
Information Sheet for Survey Respondents 
 
 
 
College of Science  
Department of Psychology 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Analysis of Kiwisaver Investment Fund Choices 
 
Please read the following note before completing the questionnaire.  
NOTE: You are invited to participate in the research project Analysis of Kiwisaver Investment 
Fund Choices by completing the following questionnaire. The aim of the project is to analyse 
why Kiwisaver members choose the particular fund that they have invested their 
contributions in.  
 
The project is being carried out as part of a Masters Thesis by Jonathan Muller under the 
supervision of Simon Kemp, who can be contacted at simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz or at 
+64 3 364 2968. He will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about 
participation in the project. 
 
The results of the project will be published as a Masters is a public document available via 
the UC library database.  You may be assured of the complete confidentiality of data 
gathered in this investigation: the identity of participants will not be made public without 
their consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, no personal information will be 
collected that could in any way link you to your response or participation in the survey. 
 
You may withdraw your participation, including withdrawal of any information you have 
provided, until your questionnaire has been added to the others collected. Because it is 
anonymous, it cannot be retrieved after that.  
 
This survey has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee. 
 
By completing the questionnaire it will be understood that you have consented to 
participate in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the project 
with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
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APPENDIX B 
KiwiSaver Investment Fund Choice Survey 
 
Individual Kiwisaver Information 
Do you have any of the following investments or savings plans? (you may tick more than 
one) 
Bank Term deposit □ 
Unit trusts or other managed fund 
investments □ 
Commercial rental properties □ Workplace superannuation scheme □ 
Directly owned shares in public companies  □ Other □ 
Investment with a finance company □ None of the above □ 
Residential rental properties □ 
 
Are you a member of the New Zealand Kiwisaver Superannuation Scheme? Yes No 
 If no then skip the rest of this section and proceed to page four 
In what year were you enrolled in the Kiwisaver scheme? 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Unsure  
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Who is your Kiwisaver Provider? 
 
AMP □ 
Gareth Morgan Kiwisaver 
Limited □ 
NZ Anglican Church 
Pension Board □ 
 
ANZ Bank □ 
Grosvenor Financial 
Services □ 
OnePath Kiwisaver 
Scheme □ 
 
Aon New Zealand Ltd □ 
Kiwibank Kiwisaver 
Scheme □ 
Professionals Group 
Holdings □ 
 
ASB Group Investments □ 
Legal & Professional 
Investment □ 
 
SBS Bank □ 
 
AXA New Zealand □ 
Medical Assurance Society 
NZ Limited □ 
 
Smartshares Limited □ 
Brook Asset Management 
Limited □ 
 
Mercer (NZ) Limited □ 
 
Staples Rodway □ 
 
Civic Assurance □ 
 
Milford Funds Limited □ 
 
SuperLife Ltd □ 
Craigs Investment Partners 
Limited □ 
Mutual Superannuation 
Fund Limited □ 
Taupo Moana Iwisaver 
Limited □ 
 
Fidelity Life □ 
 
National Bank □ 
 
TOWER □ 
Fisher Funds Management 
Ltd □ 
NZ Funds Kiwisaver 
Scheme □ 
 
Westpac □ 
 
Forsyth Barr □ 
New Zealand Harbours 
Superannuation Plan □ 
 
Unsure □ 
What best describes the type of Kiwisaver investment fund you are in? 
Cash (low risk) Bank deposits and other fixed interest investments 
□ 
Conservative (low to 
medium risk) 
A high proportion in bank deposits and fixed interest investments, 
and a lower proportion in growth assets such as shares and property □ 
Balanced (medium 
risk) 
A more equal split between higher risk growth assets such as shares 
and property, and more stable investments including fixed interest 
and bank deposits 
□ 
Growth (medium to 
high risk) 
A high proportion of shares and property with a lower level of bank 
deposits and fixed interest □ 
Aggressive (high risk) Mainly shares 
□ 
Lifetimes option Adjusts an investor's allocations to the five main asset classes based 
on his or her specific length of time to the standard New Zealand 
Superannuation qualification age (currently 65) 
□ 
Unsure  
□ 
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What is the main reason for why you are in your current Kiwisaver fund? 
It was the fund you were allocated by the IRD □ 
It was the fund you were allocated by your employer □ 
The fund best matches your level of preferred risk □ 
The scheme provider is your main bank □ 
It was recommended to you by a family member or close friend □ 
It has comparatively low fees □ 
It was recommended by a financial advisor □ 
Advertising □ 
It has a proven historical performance of giving good returns □ 
Other □ 
 
 
How many times have you changed your investment allocation? (e.g. from your provider's 
  cash fund to a growth fund) 0 1 2 3 4 5+ Unsure 
What is your current contribution level? 
 0% 2% 4% 8% Unsure 
If you answered 0% then answer the following question, if not then proceed to the question 
after it 
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Why is your contribution level currently at 0%? 
Taking a contributions holiday □ 
Contributions stopped due to significant 
financial hardship □ 
Contributions stopped because of a serious 
illness □ 
Currently unemployed □ 
 
Do you make any additional direct contributions? 
 Yes No 
On average, how often do you check your Kiwisaver balance? 
Never □ 
Once a year or less □ 
Once every six months □ 
3 – 6 times a year □ 
Once a month □ 
Once a fortnight □ 
Once a week □ 
 
Are you currently using Kiwisaver to save for a house purchase? 
 Yes No 
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Knowledge about Kiwisaver 
After how many years can you make a savings withdrawal to put towards buying a first 
     home?  ___ 
What can be withdrawn to put towards buying a first home? (you may tick more than one) 
Your contributions □ 
Your employers 
contributions □ 
The $1,000 kick-start □ 
Any member tax credits □ 
Unsure □ 
 
What is the maximum amount of the first home deposit subsidy?   $_______________ 
After how many months since beginning making contributions to Kiwisaver can members 
take a contribution holiday without a reason?   _____ 
How many years can the maximum length of a contribution holiday can be?   ______  
Are you able to permanently leave the Kiwisaver Scheme after being a member for more than 
eight weeks?  Yes No Unsure 
Who do you contact if you want to change to another Kiwisaver scheme? 
Your employer □ 
IRD □ 
Provider of your current scheme □ 
Provider of scheme you want to join □ 
Unsure □ 
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Who do you contact to keep track of your overall Kiwisaver balance? 
IRD □ 
Your employer □ 
Your scheme provider □ 
Unsure □ 
 
What is your knowledge like of the following investment asset classes? 
 Poor Fair Good Very Good Excellent 
Fixed Interest  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Property ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Shares ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Term Deposits ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Rate the following investment asset classes on a scale of perceived risk from very low risk to 
     very high risk 
 Very Low 
Risk 
   Very High 
Risk 
Fixed Interest  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Property ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Shares ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Term Deposits ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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Kiwisaver Scheme Investor Profile 
For this investment my main objective is to? 
Avoid losing money □ 
Keep up with the bank deposit rate □ 
Achieve returns marginally above the bank deposit rate □ 
Achieve returns well above the bank deposit rate □ 
Achieve the highest returns I can regardless of risk □ 
  
 
Which sentence best reflects your investment attitude? 
I don’t want to see my portfolio lose value at any time □ 
I like to minimise risks and am willing to assume only limited risks □ 
I’m comfortable with my investments losing their value for a short 
period of time, provided it’s likely they return to their original value 
□ 
I’m prepared to see my investment reduce in value for a period, 
provided this gives prospects of superior gains over the long term 
□ 
I would expect to see my investment reduce in value for a period, 
with the expectation of superior long-term returns, and I’m 
comfortable with this as my investment goal is based on the long run 
□ 
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Investment markets can go up and down in value.  By how much could the value of your total 
investment go down over one year before you’d feel uncomfortable? 
Any fall in value would 
make me feel uncomfortable □ 
A fall of 1-7% □ 
A fall of 8-13% □ 
A fall of 14-19% □ 
A fall of 20% or more □ 
  
What is your level of knowledge of and comfort around investments in shares and managed 
funds? 
I have never invested before □ 
I have only invested in term deposits and have little 
knowledge and comfort investing outside of this □ 
I have some understanding of investing, but it is very 
limited □ 
I have some knowledge and a reasonable amount of 
comfort around investments in shares or managed funds □ 
I am very comfortable with investments in shares and 
managed funds □ 
 
Have you completed similar Kiwisaver Profile questionnaires before? 
 Yes No Unsure 
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Impulsive Sensation Seeking Scale 
If you agree with a statement or decide that it describes you, circle True.  If you disagree with 
a statement or feel that it is not descriptive of you, circle False.  Answer every statement 
either True or False even if you are not entirely sure of your answer. 
 
I tend to begin a new job without much advance planning on how I will do it True False 
I usually think about what I am going to do before doing it True False 
I often do things on impulse True False 
I very seldom spend much time on the details of planning ahead True False 
I like to have new and exciting experiences and sensations even if they are a little 
     frightening 
 
True False 
Before I begin a complicated job, I make careful plans True False 
I would like to take off on a trip with no preplanned or definite routes or timetable True False 
I enjoy getting into new situations where you can't predict how things will turn out True False 
I like doing things just for the thrill of it True False 
I tend to change interests frequently True False 
I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening True False 
I'll try anything once True False 
I would like the kind of life where one is on the move and travelling a lot, with 
     lots of change and excitement 
 
True False 
I sometimes do “crazy” things just for fun True False 
I like to explore a strange city or section of town by myself, even if it means 
     getting lost 
 
True False 
I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable True False 
I often get so carried away by new and exciting things and ideas that I never think 
     of possible complications 
 
True False 
I am an impulsive person True False 
I like “wild” uninhibited parties True False 
127 
 
Investment Risk Attitude Scale 
I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns than to take a risk 
to have a chance to get the highest possible returns 
Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neither disagree 
nor agree 
Agree Agree 
completely 
 
I would never consider investments in stocks, because I find this too risky 
Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neither disagree 
nor agree 
Agree Agree 
completely 
 
If I think an investment will be profitable, I am prepared to borrow money to make this 
investment 
Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neither disagree 
nor agree 
Agree Agree 
completely 
 
I want to be certain that my investments are safe 
Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neither disagree 
nor agree 
Agree Agree 
completely 
 
I get more and more convinced that I should take greater financial risks to improve my 
financial position 
Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neither disagree 
nor agree 
Agree Agree 
completely 
 
I am prepared to take the risk to lose money, when there is also a chance to gain money 
Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neither disagree 
nor agree 
Agree Agree 
completely 
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Demographics 
You may refuse to answer any questions in this section if you feel like you do not want to 
answer 
What age group are you in? 
Under 20 □ 50-59 □ 
20-29 □ 60-65 □ 
30-39 □ 66 or over □ 
40-49 □ Refuse to answer □ 
  
Gender 
Male □ 
Female □ 
Refuse to answer □ 
           
Relationship Status 
Single □ 
Married □ 
De facto □ 
Divorced □ 
Widowed □ 
Refuse to answer □ 
 
Number of dependent children:  
None □ 
One □ 
Two □ 
Three or more □ 
Refuse to answer □ 
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Level of Education 
No formal qualification □ 
Secondary School Qualification □ 
Vocational Qualification □ 
Bachelors Degree □ 
Higher Degree  □ 
Doctorate □ 
Refuse to answer □ 
 
Employment status 
Unemployed □ 
Part time □ 
Full time □ 
Self Employed □ 
Retired □ 
Refuse to answer □ 
 
Earnings per annum 
You may only answer this question if you are currently employed 
$0 - $29,999 □ 
$30,000 - $59,999 □ 
$60,000 - $89,999 □ 
$90,000 - $119,999 □ 
$120,000 - $149,000 □ 
$150,000+ □ 
Refuse to answer □ 
 
